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I. INTRODUCTION
For several years, legal scholars, policy makers and the business
community in the United States have been debating how the law
should deal with privacy in personal information. Recent data
security breaches in the United States, such as the data thefts at
Choicepoint in 20041 and CardSystems in 20052, have heightened
this debate. At the heart of the issue is the question of tradeoffs: do
we want more privacy in our data and, as a consequence, less
efficiency and higher costs in the flow of data in commerce? Will we
tolerate less security as a result of heightened restrictions on the
access to our personal data that might be useful in combating crime
or terrorism? Thus far, the United States has protected personal data
only in an ad hoc, sectoral manner, either regulating specific
industries or specific types of information and then, only in reaction
to specific data protection problems.3 As the debate about where the
tradeoffs should be made continues, some have looked to the
European Union's very different comprehensive statutory approach
to data protection through its Data Protection Directive for
1. See Tom Zeller Jr., U.S. Settles with Company on Leak of Consumers'
Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2006, at C3 (discussing the Federal Trade
Commission's $15 million settlement with ChoicePoint, who allowed con artists
disguised as lawful businesses to access the records of more than 160,000
consumers).
2. See Eric Dash & Tom Zeller Jr., Mastercard Says 40 Million Files Are Put
at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at Al (reporting that CardSystems Solutions'
security breach compromised over 40 million credit card accounts).
3. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.90-321, 15 U.S.C. §§
1681 et seq. (governing the use of credit information in consumer credit decisions);
Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-440, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa et seq.
(governing government access to journalist's work product); Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-549, 47 U.S.C. § 551
(governing cable television providers' use of customer information); Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), Pub. L. No. 104-
191 § 262 (governing the use of personal medical data by health professionals and
health insurance providers); Gramm-Leach- Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
102 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801 et. seq. (governing the handling of financial data by
financial institutions); Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No 100-618,
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (governing the privacy of video tape rental, purchase, and
delivery information); Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-243, 47 U.S.C § 227 (governing telemarketers' use of certain consumer
information).
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guidance.4 Some have suggested that the European approach might
in certain respects serve as a model for a more comprehensive
legislative approach to data protection in the United States.' This
article posits that the European Data Protection Directive
("Directive") has not effectively made the tradeoffs that, on its face,
it purports to make. By examining the Directive through the lens of
the developing case law of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ")
interpreting it, this article shows that the European model is
unworkable in making the tradeoffs and is therefore an inappropriate
model for any proposed U.S. comprehensive data protection regime.
To this end, Part II of this article provides necessary background on
the European Union in general and on the Directive in particular.
This section will discuss the Directive's salient features, its chief
policy objectives and its implementation by the E.U. Member States.
Part III then analyzes the developing ECJ case law interpreting the
Directive and, through the lens of the cases, discerns what the E.U.'s
highest court has and has not done to effectuate the tradeoffs
contemplated by the Directive between data privacy, on the one
hand, and the free flow of data necessary for commerce and security
on the other hand. Part IV discusses that the cases demonstrate that
the Directive is an ineffective means for making the tradeoffs and
thus Europe has not provided any kind of workable model to
determine how much security and data flow should be sacrificed in
4. See generally Council Directive 95/46, arts. 1-34, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31,
38-50 (EC).
5. See, e.g., Marsha Cope Huie et al., The Right to Privacy in Personal Data:
The E. U. Prods the U.S. and Controversy Continues, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
391, 405 (2002) ("The sharp European contrast [on data protection] with the
United States . . . invites serious study and even emulation"); Ryan Moshell,
Comment, .. .And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United
States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 357, 368-87 (2005) (suggesting that the United States needs
comprehensive data protection legislation and identifying the European Union as
one such model); Arnulf S. Gubitz, The U.S. Aviation and Transportation Security
Act of 2001 in Conflict with the E. U. Data Protection Laws: How Much Access to
Airline Passenger Data Does the United States Need to Combat Terrorism?, 39
NEW ENG. L. REV. 431, 472 (2005) (arguing that the United States should attempt
to meet European Union standards by adopting stricter privacy standards); Kamaal
Zaidi, Comment, Harmonizing U.S.-E.U. Online Privacy Laws: Toward a U.S.
Comprehensive Regime for the Protection of Personal Data, 12 MICH. ST. J. INT'L
L. 169, 17 1-76 (2003) (identifying the existing influences of the E.U. Directive on
U.S. policy).
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the name of data privacy. The European approach to data privacy
should thus not serve as a model for any potential omnibus
legislation in the United States. Finally, this last section posits
several suggestions that might help U.S. law makers strike a more
meaningful balance between data privacy and the societal necessity
of access to personal data. But first, a little background about the
current U.S. data protection situation:
On January 26, 2006, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
announced that it had reached a $15 million settlement in its action
against U.S. data aggregator and brokerage firm ChoicePoint Inc.6
The case stemmed frgmthe company's February 2005 revelation that
it had inadvertently sold sensitive personal data on about 145,000
consumers to phony companies set up by thieves to acquire the
information.7 The $15 million was apparently the largest civil
penalty ever imposed by the FTC.8 Before this incident, most
Americans never even knew that ChoicePoint existed let alone that it
Was in the business of collecting all manner of data on all U.S.
citizens. The ChoicePoint incident was hardly an isolated case.
During the past two years, the United States has witnessed an
unprecedented number of disclosures by private companies,
government agencies and universities that they have somehow
allowed the sensitive personal data of millions of Americans to get
lost or end up in the wrong hands. The recent well-publicized data
security breaches at CitiFinancial,9 Reed Elsevier subsidiary
LexisNexis,1 ° Bank of America,11  DSW Shoe Warehouse,1
2
6. See Zeller, supra note 1 (identifying $10 million in fines and $5 million in
consumer compensation).
7. See William Sluis, Choicepoint Hit by Identity-theft Scam; May Affect
145,000, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 2005, at Business 3 (reporting ChoicePoint's
acknowledgement that the thieves set up fifty accounts and received a variety of
consumer data, including names addresses, Social Security numbers, and credit
reports).
8. See Zeller, supra note 1.
9. See Tom Zeller Jr., U.P.S. Loses a Shipment of Citigroup Client Data, N,.
TIMES, June 7, 2005, at C1 (reporting that the United Parcel Service lost a box of
CitiFinancial's computer tapes with information regarding 3.9 million consumers,
but that investigators had failed to identify any theft or data compromise).
10. See Tom Zeller Jr., Another Data Broker Reports a Breach, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2005, at C1 (discussing LexisNexis Group's report of a security breach in
which thieves posing as subscribers acquired names, addresses, and Social Security
numbers of roughly 30,000 people).
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CardSystems, 13 University of California at Berkley 14 and the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs 5 are a small sampling of incidences
that were disclosed to the public in 2005 and 2006. The attention
brought on by these data security breaches has largely exposed the
previously hidden world of commercial data aggregators and
prompted law makers to hold hearings and consider legislative
proposals for increased protection of personal data. 16
11. See David Wells & Holly Yeager, Data on 1.2m BofA Customers Go
Missing, FIN. TIMES U.S.A., Feb. 26, 2005, at First Section 1 (following Bank of
America's report of missing computer tapes containing personal information of 1.2
million government employees).
12.. See Associated Press, Theft Yields 1.4 Million Credit Card Numbers, N.Y.
,TIMES, Apr. 19, 2005, at C3 (discussing the DSW Shoe Warehouse security breach
where thieves acquired 1.4 million names and corresponding credit card numbers
of customers).
13. See Dash & Zeller, supra note 2 (stating that the CardSystems security
breach compromised about 20 million Visa accounts and 13.9 million MasterCard
accounts).
14. See Ann McDonald, Security Scramble: High-profile Security Breaches
Are Prompting Calls for Stricter Regulations to Better Safeguard Consumer's
Personal and Financial Information. What is the Industry's Response?,
COLLECTIONS & CREDIT RISK, May 2, 2005, at 28 (reporting the theft from a
university office of a laptop computer containing personal information on nearly
100,000 alumni).
15. See David Stout & Tom Zeller Jr., Vast Data Cache About Veterans Has
Been Stolen, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at Al (reporting the theft of roughly 26.5
million veterans' personal information from a Department of Veterans Affairs
employee home).
16. See Evan Perez, Identity Theft Puts Pressure on Data Sellers, WALL ST. J.,
Feb 18, 2005, at BI (noting multiple critiques of the self-regulating focused
regime); Tom Zeller Jr., Data Broker Executives Agree Security Laws May Be
Needed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at C3 (reporting the agreement between
ChoicePoint and LexisNexis that new legislation may be necessary to deal with
identity theft and to clarify the rules governing data brokers' work); Jonathan
Krim, Parties Split on Data-Protection Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2005, at D4
(observing the partisan divides over a bill that requires consumer notification and
security audits in the event of certain data breaches); Tom Zeller Jr., Breach Points
Up Flaws in Privacy Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2005, at C1 (emphasizing the
current 'patchwork of sometimes conflicting state and federal rules that govern
-consumer privacy and commercial data vendors"); Michele Heller, Raft of Bills on
Data Security, But Little Clarity, AM. BANKER, May 4, 2005, at 1 (observing the
emergence of a large number of bills in response to public concern over data
privacy, most of which will not survive deliberations); Jonathan Peterson, U.S.
Senate Panel Tackles Identity Theft, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at Business 1
(following various lawmakers' proposals for new legislation to include tougher
security requirements, harsher penalties, and broader notification requirements);
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In the United States, protection of personal data is currently
governed by a patchwork of legislation that is applicable either to
specific industry sectors or to specific types of information.17 Gaps in
protection are purportedly filled by a so-called "self regulatory"
scheme.' 8 In addition to this legislative patchwork and system of self-
regulation, some states (most notably California in 2003) have
passed statutes requiring companies to publicly disclose when data
security breaches occur.19 California-'s statute is credited with making
Americans aware of the potential unauthorized exposure of their
personal information. 2° This public awareness has given rise to a
recent call for more comprehensive consumer protection for personal
data.2'
The national interest in a more comprehensive approach to
regulating the use of personal data has naturally led scholars to
examine the European approach to protection of personal data.22 The
Byron Acohido & Jon Swartz, Industry, Congress Develop Tactics to Reduce
Online Risks, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 3, 2005, at 2B (discussing how financial
industry officials, regulators, and Congress have joined forces to respond to online
security risks and balance convenience and security); Digital Business: In the US.,
FfN. TIMES REP., Feb. 22, 2006, at Digital Business 3 (discussing several recent
proposals for data privacy legislation in the United States).
17. See supra note 3.
18. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or
Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 208-09 (1992)
(recognizing that, in addition to some ad hoc statutory protection for information
privacy, various companies and industries have adopted self-regulatory schemes
without individual legal enforcement mechanisms); Marc Rotenberg, Fair
Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get),
2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 117 (contrasting U.S. efforts to enhance government
surveillance capabilities while, at the same time, depending on private industry to
advance individual privacy through self regulatory schemes).
19. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.29(b) (2003) ("Any agency that maintains
computerized data that includes personal information that the agency does not own
shall notify the owner or licensee of the information of any breach of the security
of the data immediately following discovery ... ").
20. See, e.g., Marilyn Geewax, ChoicePoint Scandal Driving Stricter Global
Privacy Rules, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 9, 2005, at 2F (reporting that ChoicePoint
was pressured to apply the California standards of disclosure to all affected
consumers).
21. See supra note 16.
22. See Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38
Hous. L. REV. 717, 748-49 (2001) (emphasizing the need to harmonize conflicting
U.S.-E.U. information policies); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting
International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1315
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European Union has had comprehensive data protection legislation in
place now for more than ten years (and some individual Member
States have had it for much longer).,3 In 1995, two of the principal
bodies of the European Union, the European Parliament and the
European Council, jointly passed Directive 95/46/EC on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data.24 The Directive
represents an approach to data protection that differs sharply from
the ad hoc, sectoral and self-regulatory American approach and,
instead, regulates both the public and private sector, and covers a
broad range of actors and activities2 5 The Directive required all E.U.
(2000) (arguing that "international cooperation" is "imperative for effective data
protection in cyber-space"); Fred H. Cate, The Changing Face of Privacy
Protection in the European Union and the United States, 33 IND. L. REv. 173,
230-31 (1999) (examining the differing approaches to privacy protection in the
United States and the European Union and concluding that neither are adequate in
the internet context); Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy
Directive and International Relations, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655, 665-70
(2002) (emphasizing that the study of underlying philosophical differences
between U.S. and European information privacy laws is a valuable analytical
policy tool); Stephen Hinde, Privacy Legislation: A Comparison of the U.S. and
European Approaches, 22 J. COMPUTERS & SECURITY 378 (2003); see also Chuan
Sun, The European Union Privacy Directive and lts Impact on the U.S. Privacy
Protection Policy: A Year 2003 Perspective, 2 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 5, 3-
5, 13-15 (2003) (examining the effect of E.U. data privacy practices on U.S.
commerce practices); David Raj Nijhawan, Note, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A
Critique of Applying the European Union Approach to Privacy Regulation in the
United States, 56 VAND. L. REv. 939, 975-76 (2003) (concluding that traditional
American privacy values prevent the implementation of a European approach in
the United States).
23. See generally Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, arts. 1-34, 1995 O.J.
(L 281) at 38-50; see also Gubitz, supra note 5, at 434-37 (reviewing the
development of E.U. data protection laws within broader international
frameworks).
24. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 38
(focusing on natural persons' "right to privacy with respect to the processing of
personal data").
25. Compare supra note 3 (setting forth U.S. statutes addressing information
privacy in specific contexts) with Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 2,
1995 O.J. (L 281) at 38 (defining "personal data" as "any information relating to
an identified or identifiable person" and defining "processing" as "any operation or
set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by
automatic means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or
2007]
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Member States to pass by 1998 national legislation implementing the
provisions of the Directive.26
To more fully understand the tradeoffs between data privacy and
the free flow of data contemplated by the Directive, it is necessary to
first have a brief look at some of the basics of the E.U. system and
then some of the salient features and fundamental policy objectives
of the Directive.
II. A PRIMER ON THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
DIRECTIVE 95/46EC
The European Union consists of three principal bodies and its
courts27: the Council of the European Union, often referred to as the
Council of Ministers (the "Council"); the European Commission (the
"Commission"); the European Parliament (the "Parliament"); the
European Court of Justice with an attendant Court of First Instance;
and the Court of Auditors. 28 As far as the law making function is
concerned, as a general matter, laws are enacted in the European
Union by the Council and often, but not always, together with the
Parliament based on proposals sent to it by the Commission.29
destruction"). The Directive operates, in part, with respect to each "controller,"
"the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which
alone or-jointly with others determines the purposes and means of the processing
of personal data." Id.
26. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 32, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 49
("Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative
provisions necessary to comply with this Directive at the latest at the end of a
period of three years from the date of its adoption.").
27. See DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR.PRESS & COMMC'N, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
How THE EUROPEAN UNION WORKS 3-4 (2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu-glance/53/2006-en.pdf (discussing the
primary lawmaking E.U. bodies, as well as such institutions such as the
Ombudsman and financial and advisory bodies).
28. See id. The Council of the European Union should not be confused with the
European Council, which creates high level policy guidance at biannual meetings
between certain member state leaders. See JOHN MCCORMICK, UNDERSTANDING
THE EUROPEAN UNION 80 (3d ed. 2005).
29. See DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR PRESS & COMMC'N, supra note 27, at 7-8
(describing the decision-making process of the European Union, where in most
cases the European Commission proposes new legislation and the Council and
Parliament pass the laws, a co-decision procedure giving the Parliament and the
Council equal legislative power).
[22:745
PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY TRADEOFFS
Procedures for enacting laws in the European Union are set forth in
the foundational treaties and every piece of E.U. legislation must set
forth a specific treaty provision as the "legal basis" for the
legislation.3" The three procedures for adopting legislation at the
European level that are set forth in the foundational treaties are
"consultation.. "assent" and "co-decision" and they basically
describe the manner in which the Parliament interacts with the
Council and, more specifically, how much legislative power the
Parliament shares with the Council.31 Although the Parliament
formerly had limited law making powers, it has managed to increase
its power to enact legislation to a point where, in many legislative
areas, it now stands on more or less equal footing with the Council.32
Thus, the Commission sets the legislative agenda and the Council
with some level of involvement of the Parliament enacts the law.33
It should be kept in mind that the European Union is not a federal
system like the United States, but instead a union of sovereign states
bound together by treaties under what has been called a system of
"pooled sovereignty."34 The system of pooled sovereignty in part
explains the requirement that laws passed at the E.U. level must be
based on a provision of one of the foundational treaties that
demonstrates the European Union's competence to legislate in a
given area.35 Tied in with this point is the notion of the so-called
30. See id. (describing the legal basis requirement as a means of identifying
relevant procedural requirements).
31. See id. The "consultation" procedure requires Parliamentary approval of
Commission proposals, and allows Parliament to either reject a proposal or suggest
amendments. Id. The "assent" procedure, which apples to certain "very important
decisions," requires Parliamentary approval of Commission proposals, and allows
Parliament to either reject or approve a proposal, but not to suggest amendments.
Id. The "co-decision" procedure distributes legislative power equally between the
Parliament and Council, and includes a "conciliation committee" designed to
resolve differences over Commission proposals. Id.
32. See MCCORMICK, supra note 28, at 94 (following the Parliament's growing
role in E.U. governance, including more power to amend laws and monitor the
activities of other institutions).
33. See generally DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR PRESS & COMMC'N, supra note 27,
at 7-8 (discussing the decision-making process of the European Union).
34. See id. at 3 (explaining that "pooling sovereignty" involves delegating
some state decision-making powers on matters of common interest to shared
institutions to be made democratically).
35. The requirement to set forth a foundational treaty provision as the legal
basis for legislation is also a demonstration of the amount of national sovereignty
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"Three Pillars" in the structure of the European Union.3 6 The three-
pillar structure has its origins in the fact that European Union is
really an international organization of sovereign states.37 Each pillar
more or less represents the level of competency that E.U. institutions
may have in certain regulatory areas. The first pillar comprises
economic union and concerns matters relating to the establishment
and functioning of the single internal market, economic expansion
and the four basic economic freedoms.38 The second pillar involves
matters of foreign and security policy; while the third pillar relates to
matters of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters among
individual Member States.3 9 Since the European Union was born out
of the idea of a common market, the Member States have delegated
considerable sovereignty to E.U. institutions in the area of internal
market regulation.4" With respect to the other two pillars, Member
States were less willing to give up national sovereignty in areas of
foreign policy, state security and criminal law.4 Therefore, E.U.
institutions are more restricted in regulating in these second and third
pillar areas. This is not to say that E.U. governmental bodies cannot
act in these areas; it just means that there are significant obstacles to
that Member States have delegated to E.U. institutions in particular subject areas.
36. See DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR PRESS & COMMC'N, supra note 27, at 5
(tracing the development of the "Three Pillars" to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on
European Union).
37. See id. at 3 (observing that "the E.U. is not a federation like the United
States. ... The countries remain independent sovereign nations").
38. See PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 14 (2003) ("[O]nly this pillar comprises truly supranational bodies with an
institutional existence that is autonomous of the Member States."). The four
economic freedoms, often referred to by the concept "freedom of movement," are
the free movement of goods, people, services, and capital within the European
Union's common market. See Robert F. Rick & Kelly R. Merrick, Cross Border
Health Care in the European Union: Challenges and Opportunities, 23 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 64, 74 (2006).
39. See STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 14-16 (explaining that the first pillar
is the European Community, the second is the Common Foreign and Security
Policy, and the third is police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters); see
also DIRECTORATE-GEN. FOR PRESS & COMMC'N, supra note 27, at 5 (illustrating
the three pillars).
40. See STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 14 (observing that only economic
pillar created a "truly supranational body").
41. See id. (noting that these intergovernmental bodies preserve national
sovereignty by requiring the consent of each member state before action is taken).
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getting legislation passed at the European level when the European
Union is required to use a second or third pillar basis for it.42
Once the proper basis for E.U. legislation is determined, the two
main forms that legislation is likely to take in the European Union
are regulations and directives.43 A regulation on a specific subject has
immediate and direct effect within the Member States whereas
directives enunciate the main goals to be achieved by the legislation,
but leave it to the individual Member States to best determine how to
achieve the goals by their own national implementing legislation.44
Directive 95/46/EC, as its designation suggests, was passed as the
latter type of legislation.45 While the Directive contains a reasonably
specific framework detailing the protection to be afforded to
individuals with respect to their personal data, the national
governments of the Member States are required to pass their own
implementing legislation to give effect to the Directive46, and the
national legislation must be in harmony with and be designed to
achieve the objectives of the Directive. 47 The Directive is a first pillar
42. In fact, the Second and Third Pillar areas might be characterized more
properly as agreement among the sovereign Member States to work in close
cooperation rather than a grant of authority to E.U. institutions to regulate on
behalf of the Member States. The institutions are more or less used to carry out the
agreements struck among the Member States in these areas. See generally
STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 38, at 14-16 (discussing the absence of a permanent
institutional framework for cooperation in these two pillars).
43. See MCCORMICK, supra note 28, at 83 (outlining the five main forms of
E.U. law: regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions).
44. See id.
45. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, 1995 O.J. (L 281).
46. Id. art. 32, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 49 (directing the Member States to bring
into force "laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply
with the Directive"). Thus, even though legislative enactments at the E.U. level are
ostensibly meant to harmonize the laws of the Member States (and further the aims
of the common market), E.U. legislation in the form of a directive seeks also to
preserve a measure of state sovereignty among the Member States by leaving it to
each Member to decide how best to achieve the goals of a given directive. In spite
of one of the main stated purposes behind the Directive being "to coordinate the
laws of the Member States so as to ensure that the cross-border flow of personal
data is regulated in a consistent manner," Id. pmbl. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 32,
Member States can enact legislation to achieve this in differing ways.
47. Compare Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act],
Jan. 14, 2003, BGBI. I at 66, last amended by Gesetz, Aug. 25, 2006, BGBI. I at
1970 (F.R.G.), available at
http://www.bfdi.bund.de/cln_029/nn_946430/EN/DataProtectionActs/Artikel/Bun
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E.U. law since it was passed on the basis of Article 95 of the Treaty
of the European Community ("EC Treaty") which provides that
"[t]he Council shall,... adopt the measures for the approximation of
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action
in Member States which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the internal market. 48
The preamble and Article 1 of the Directive state that the dual
purposes of the Directive are to (1) provide citizens with protection
of their fundamental right to privacy with respect to the processing of
personal data and (2) ensure that free flow of data between Member
States is not restricted or prohibited due to differing levels of
protection afforded to personal data in the Member States.4 9 The
Directive thus seeks to balance the E.U. citizens' privacy interests in
personal data against the public need for the flow of personal data;
the Directive therefore seeks to tradeoff some level of data flow for
data privacy.50
desdatenschutzgesetz-
FederalDataProtectionAct,templateld=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/Bundesdat
enschutzgesetz-FederalDataProtectionAct.pdf (executing Germany's obligations
under the Directive), with Law No. 2004-801 of Aug. 6, 2004, Journal Officiel de
la R6publique Franqaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 7, 2004, p. 14063
(Fr.), available at http://www.cnilfr/fileadmin/documents/uk/78-17VA.pdf
(executing France's obligations under the Directive), and Upper House of the
Dutch Parliament, Personal Data Protection Act, WWW
http://www.dutchdpa.nl/downloads-wetten/wbp.pdf (consulted Mar. 22, 2007)
(executing Holland's obligations under the Directive), and Data Protection Act,
1998, c. 29, § tbd (Eng.) (executing the United Kingdom's obligations under the
Directive).
48. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community art. 95, reprinted in Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European
Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2002 O.J. (C 325)
33, 369 (EC) [hereinafter E.C. Treaty]; see also Council Directive 95/46, supra
note 4, pmbl., 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 32 (citing Article 100a of the E.C. Treaty, now
renumbered as Article 95, as the-basis on which the Directive was adopted); Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 100a, O.J. (C 340) 173, available at
http://www.hri.org/docs/Rome57/Part3Title05.html#Art100a (demonstrating that
Article 100a in the 1957 E.C. Treaty is the same language as Article 95 in the 2002
version of the E.C. Treaty).
49. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, pmbl. 3, 7, 8, 9, art. 1, 1995 O.J.
(L 281) at 31-32, 38.
50. Id. pmbl. 3 (recognizing that while the "free movement of goods, persons,
services, and capital" depends on the free flow of information, "fundamental rights
of individuals should be safeguarded").
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The Directive's broadly defined terms give it broad application.
Among its key terms are "personal data," "processing of personal
data" and "controller." The Directive applies to all "personal data"
which is "any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person" and "an identifiable person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular or by reference to an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his
physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity."'" "Processing of personal data" is defined as "any
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data,
whether or not by automatic means" and the definition lists as
examples "collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or
alteration ... use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination" as well
as other processes. 2 The Directive applies to all "controllers" who
are defined as "natural or legal person[s], public authority, agency or
any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the
purposes and means of the processing of personal data."53 In defining
the scope of the Directive, Article 3 states that it "shall apply to the
processing of personal data wholly or partly by automatic means, and
to the processing otherwise than by automatic means of personal data
which form part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a
filing system."54
Specifically excluded from the scope of the Directive is the
processing of personal data that is done (1) in the course of activities
falling outside the scope of European Community law, and activities
relating to public and state security and criminal matters (i.e.,
typically second and third pillar matters) and (2) "by [a] natural
person[] in the course of purely personal or household activity."55
Thus, the Directive applies to a wide variety of personally
identifiable information, it applies to both public and private sector
actors, applies to a broad range of processing activities, but excludes
activities generally related to public security or criminal matters and
to household activities such as an individual keeping an address
book.
51. 'Id. art. 2(a).
52. Id. art. 2(b).
53. Id. art. 2(d).
54. Id. art. 3(1).
55. Id. art. 3(2).
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One scholar has identified eight basic principles in the Directive
which demonstrate its far-reaching, individual rights centered and
comprehensive approach. 6 These human rights centered principles
as well as the competing goal of the Directive in ensuring that the
56. See Cate, supra note 22, at 185-86. First, the "Purpose Limitation
Principle," id., requires that personal data be collected only for "specified, explicit
and legitimate purposes" and not used in ways that are inconsistent with those
purposes or stored longer than necessary to accomplish those purposes. Council
Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 6(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 40. Second, the
"Data Quality Principle," Cate, supra note 22, at 185, requires that personal data
be kept "accurate" and "up-to-date." Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art.
6(d), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 40. Third, the "Data Security Principle," Cate, supra
note 22, at 185, requires that appropriate measures be implemented to protect
personal data from "accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss,
alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access . . . and against all other unlawful
forms of processing." Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 17(1), 1995 O.J.
(L 281) at 43. Fourth, the "Special Protection for the Sensitive Data Principle,"
Cate, supra note 22, at 185, prohibits the processing of personal data "revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-
union membership, and.., data concerning the health or sex life" unless one of the
enumerated exceptions applies. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 8, 1995
O.J. (L 281) at 40. Fifth, the "Transparency Principle," Cate, supra note 22, at
185-86, requires that the data subject be informed of the fact that her data is being
processed, who is doing the processing and for what purpose and provides for the
data subject's right of access to the data and the ability to rectify erroneous data.
Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, pmbl. 38, arts. 10, 11,12, 1995 O.J. (L
281) at 35,40-41. Sixth, the "Data Transfers Principle," Cate, supra note 22, at
186, prohibits controllers from transferring personal data (which they are
authorized to process) to third parties without first obtaining the consent of the data
subject and prohibits the transfer of data across borders to third countries lacking
an "adequate level of protection." Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, pmbl.
34, 35, arts. 8(1)d, 14(b), 25(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 34, 35, 41, 43, 45. Seventh,
the "Independent Oversight Principle," Cate, supra note 22, at 186, is manifest
through the supervisory authorities created in each Member State empowered to
investigate and audit data processing activities and bring enforcement proceedings
against non-compliant processors. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 28
1995 O.J. (L 281) at 47. The Working Party set up by Article 29 also provides
independent oversight in that it is empowered to render interpretations of the
Directive. Id. art. 29, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 48. Eighth, the "Individual Redress
Principle," Cate, supra note 22, at 186, provides individuals with the right to
access and demand erasure or correction of inaccurate data, the right to judicial
remedies including damages awards against controllers and also obligates Member
States to "lay down the sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement." Council
Directive 95/46, supra note 4, arts. 6(d), 12, 22, 23, 24, 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at
40, 42, 45, 47. The supervisory authorities established by Article 28 may also hear
claims brought by any person for a breach of obligations under the Directive. Id.
art. 28 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 47.
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free flow of data is not inhibited within the Union are enshrined in
some of the Directive's most important provisions. In addition to
Article 2's broad definitions of "personal data," "processing of
personal data," and "controller" mentioned above,57 Article 2 broadly
defines what constitutes the "data subject's consent."58 Article 6
enshrines the data quality principle by detailing the conditions in
which the data must be maintained (e.g., kept "accurate," "up-to-
date," "relevant" and "not excessive") and manner in which
processing may take place. 9 Article 7 defines the criteria for making
data processing legitimate, the most important of these criteria being
when the data subject has provided "unambiguous[]... consent" to the
processing. 60 Article 8 places special restrictions on the processing of
certain special categories of data typically referred to as sensitive
data.61 Data such as racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership and data
relating to health or sex life are considered to be particularly
sensitive and worthy of a higher degree of protection.62 Articles 10
and 11 detail the information that must be provided by the controller
to the data subject about her data and its processing. 63 Article 12
provides for the data subject's somewhat qualified right to access her
personal data and to demand erasure or correction of it.64 Article 13
sets out the right of Member States to be exempt from certain of the
provisions of the Directive when necessary for reasons of national or
public security, defense, criminal matters, to protect an important
economic interest.65 Article 14 gives the data subject certain rights to
object to the processing of her data.66 Articles 22, 23, and 24 detail
57. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 2, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 38.
58. See id. art. 2(h), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 39 ("[T]he data subject's consent'
shall mean any freely given specific and informed indication of his wishes by
which the data subject signifies his agreement to personal data relating to him
being processed.")
59. Id. art. 6, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 40.
60. Id. art. 7, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at40.
61. Id. art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 40.
62. Id.
63. Id. arts. 10, 11, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 41-42 (providing that, for example, the
data subject must be provided with information regarding the identity of the
controller, the processing purpose, and possible further recipients of the data).
64. Id. art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 42.
65. Id. art. 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 42.
66. Id. art. 14, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 42-43.
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the judicial remedies, liability and sanctions available for
noncompliance with the Directive.67 Finally, Article 25 deals with the
transfer of data to third countries, i.e., non-E.U. Member States.68
This provision specifically prohibits the transfer of data to third
countries that do not provide an "adequate" level of protection.69
Article 25 also specifies how the adequacy of protection in a third
country is to be assessed, and that the Commission is to undertake
this assessment and what can be done in light of the Commissions
findings on adequacy.7°
While the above rendition of the Directive's salient features
suggests that the European legislators have determined precisely the
point at which the tradeoff between privacy and free flow of data is
to be made, the Directive's seemingly straightforward approach is
deceptive. Two recent European Court of Justice decisions on the
subject of the Directive illustrate that, when applied to real facts, the
Directive cannot effectively make the tradeoffs it portends.71
Well, to be fair, there was a case decided on the subject of the
Directive a few months prior to the first of the two case alluded to
above.72 This first ECJ case dealing with the Directive seemed to
achieve the tradeoffs. But, this initial case was easy. Its facts
involved the least tension between privacy and data flow. It is
therefore briefly discussed here to provide a backdrop and to act as a
foil for the latter two cases. The two subsequent (and more
celebrated) cases involved facts that more clearly demonstrate the
tensions between the competing goals of data privacy and data flow.
The Court's formulaic and forced findings in the two latter cases
expose the flaws in the Directive's capacity to effectuate the
tradeoffs its language so clearly sets out.
67. Id. arts. 22, 23, 24, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 45.
68. Id. art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 45-46.
69. Id. art. 25(4), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 46.
70. Id. art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 45-46.
71. Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. 1-12971, 1 C.M.L.R. 20 (2004);
Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, Eur. Parliament v. Council of the Eur. Union
(PNR), 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721, 3 C.M.L.R. 9 (2006).
72. Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138 & 139/01, Rechnungshofv. Rundfunk, 2003
E.C.R. 1-4989, 3 C.M.L.R. 10 (2003).
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III. THE ECJ CASES INTERPRETING THE
DIRECTIVE
Each of the three ECJ cases provides a window through which to
examine whether the Directive makes the appropriate tradeoff
between data privacy and the free flow of data. The first two cases
discussed below, Rundfunk and Lindqvist, relate primarily to the
tradeoff between data privacy for individuals and the need for free
flow of data in society for use by the public and commercial actors.
The third case involves the tradeoff between data privacy and the
free flow of data to public authorities for security purposes, for
example, the use of personal data to track the movements of
suspected criminals or terrorists. While Rundfunk shows how the
tradeoffs under the Directive should work, the latter two cases which
involve less straightforward circumstances illustrate that the broadly
applicable tradeoffs contemplated by the language of the Directive
cannot be realized in any practical way.
A. RECHNUNGSHOF AND OTHERS V. OSTERREICHISCHER R UNDFUNK
AND OTHERS
Rundfunk evolved from two cases pending in Austrian national
courts involving basically the same issues and which the ECJ
consolidated for review.73 The case involved the application of an
Austrian statute that required certain public bodies that are subject to
the control of the Rechnungshof (the Court of Auditors) to disclose
salaries and pensions over a certain amount paid by the public bodies
to employees and pensioners.74 Along with the salary and pension
information, the statute also required disclosure of the names of the
persons receiving the remuneration.75 The Court of Auditors was
then to prepare an annual report that was to be transmitted to the
upper and lower houses of the Austrian Federal Parliament and to the
provincial assemblies and also made available to the general public.76
Several public bodies subject to the statutory obligations (local and
regional authorities, a public broadcasting corporation and a statutory
73. Id. at 285-86 (recounting the procedural posture of the case).
74. Id. at 286.
75. Id. at 287.
76. Id. at 286-87.
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professional body) provided the Court of Auditors with less than full
disclosure of the information. 77 These bodies either failed to
communicate the data, communicated it in an anonymized form, or
refused to give access to the information or made such access subject
to conditions that the Court of Auditors was unwilling to accept. 78
The Court of Auditors then brought proceedings before the Austrian
Federal Constitutional Court against the public bodies seeking a
declaratory ruling that the Court of Auditors indeed has the
jurisdiction to decide what information is to be disclosed.79 The
Austrian Constitutional Court recognized that the legislature's intent
in making the salary and pension data public was to provide the
general public with "comprehensive information" and that "...
through this information, pressure is brought to bear on the bodies
concerned to keep salaries at a low level, so that public funds are
used thriftily, economically and efficiently."8 The Constitutional
Court also recognized, however, that the public disclosure of
personal data involves important fundamental rights under
Community law, namely, rights to protection of personal data under
the Directive and right to respect for private life under the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("ECHR"). 1 The Constitutional Court therefore stayed
these proceedings and referred several questions to the ECJ for
preliminary ruling. 2
At roughly the same time as the above case was pending, two
employees of Osterreichischer Rundfunk ("ORF"), a public
broadcasting company subject to the disclosure requirement, brought
77. Id. at 286, 289.
78. Id. at 289.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 287.
81. Id. at 288-90 (citing multiple provisions of the Directive, which imports
standards from the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms); see Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5
[hereinafter ECHR] (providing that "everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home, and his correspondence," and that this right shall
only be interfered with "in the interests of national security, public safety, or the
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others").
82. See Rundfunk, 3 C.M.L.R. at 290.
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proceedings against their employer to prevent ORF from disclosing
their salary information. s3 The highest regional court in Vienna
determined that the Austrian statue was consistent with both
fundamental rights to privacy and the Directive even where the
statute requires the communication of the salary information along
with the names of the recipients.84 The employees appealed to the
Austrian Supreme Court. That court also stayed the proceedings and
referred essentially the same questions for a preliminary ruling to the
ECJ as did the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court.85
In essence, the questions put before the ECJ were:
(1) Does the Directive even apply to the situations before the
Court?
(2) Assuming that the Directive does apply, does it preclude
national legislation of the sort at issue which requires
certain public bodies to disclose personal information on
salaries and pensions which includes the names of the
recipients?
(3) If the answer to the above question is at least partially yes,
are the provisions of the Directive that preclude the
national legislation "directly applicable" in the sense that
they may be directly relied on by individuals before
national courts to oust the application of the precluded
legislation?86
On the first question, the ECJ held that the Directive indeed
applies to the processing of personal data as required by the Austrian
legislation.87 The Court found that the applicability of the Directive
cannot rest on a cases-by-case determination of whether specific
situations at issue have a sufficient link with the free movement
83. See id.
84. See id. at 291.
85. See id. at 290-91 (referring explicitly to the parallel proceedings).
86. See id. at 292, 294, 301 (asserting that, in order to answer the final two
questions, the ECJ would first have to presuppose that the Directive is applicable
in the proceedings, a disputed proposition in the proceedings).
87. See id. at 293-94.
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within the European Union88 i.e., a sufficient link with the
functioning of internal European market, to justify the application of
Community law instead of or in derogation of the law of an
individual Member State.8 9 The Court further found that the
exceptions under Article 3(2)90 (i.e., data processing done in
connection with certain activities of the state or by individuals in the
course of purely household activities) did not apply to exclude the
situation from the scope of the Directive. 9'
On the; second question, the ECJ held that the Directive does not
preclude the national legislation at issue provided that it is shown
that the wide disclosure requirements under the statute of not merely
income amounts but also of names is necessary for and appropriate
to the objective of proper management of public funds as
contemplated by the Austrian legislature.92 The Court, however, left
it for the Austrian national courts to decide whether the disclosure
requirements were necessary to achieve the legislature's objective.93
In its analysis on this point, the ECJ also discussed at length the
relationship between the Directive and provisions of the ECHR,
specifically, Article 8's guarantee94 of the respect for the private life
88. "Free movement" is a term that generally describes the unrestricted
movement of goods, people, services and capital, etc., within the single, common,
internal market of the European Community. See E.C. Treaty, supra note 48, art.
3(l)(c), 2002 O.J. (C 325) at 40; see also discussion supra note 38 (listing the four
economic freedoms often referred to as the "freedom of movement" concept).
89. See Rundfunk, 3 C.M.L.R. at 293. Recall that the Directive was enacted on
the basis of Article 95 of the EC Treaty, which has as its purpose the establishment
and function of the internal market; therefore, the Directive is a First-Pillar market-
related law. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
90. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 3(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at
39.
91. See Rundfunk, 3 C.M.L.R..at 294 (finding that the processing of personal
data at issue (1) did not concern the exercise of an activity outside the scope of
Community Law, such as those found in Titles V and VI of the Treaty on
European Union; and (2) did not concern public security, defense, State security,
or State criminal law activities).
92. See id. at 301 (analyzing Articles 6(l)(c), 7(c), and 7(e) of the Directive).
93. See id. at 300 (noting the legislation's objective of keeping salaries within
reasonable limitations).
94. See ECHR, supra note 81, art. 8 (guaranteeing everyone the right to
"respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence," and
allowing only carefully limited interference by public authorities).
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of the individual.95 Here, the Court weighed the "existence of an
interference with private life" against "a justification of the
interference" and then determined that if the Austrian statute at issue
was incompatible with ECHR Article 8's respect for private life, it
must necessarily also be incompatible with the provisions of the
Directive.96 The ECJ then concluded that the above balancing test
applies under the Directive.97
On the third issue, the ECJ determined that, although the Directive
confers a certain amount of leeway in the implementation of some of
its provisions, the provisions of the Directive98 that were invoked in
this case state unconditional obligations and therefore may be relied
on by individuals in national courts to oust the application of national
laws that are contrary to these provisions.9 9 Thus, if on remand the
Austrian courts were to determine that the disclosure requirements
were not necessary to achieve the legislature's objectives, the
95. See Rundfunk, 3 C.M.L.R. at 297-300 (explaining that, before applying the
applicable provisions of the Directive, the ECJ must first decide whether the
legislation at issue interferes with private life, and if so, whether that interference
is justified based on Article 8 of the ECHR).
96. See id. at 298-300 (remarking that the national courts will make the final
determination on the compatibility of the legislation at issue with Article 8 of the
ECHR).
97. See id. at 301 (holding that the national court must "interpret any provision
of national law, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the
applicable directive").
98. See id. at 301-02 (referring to Articles 6(1)(c), 7(c) and 7(e)). Article
6(1)(c) of the Directive relates to data quality and states that "Member States shall
provide that personal data must be . . . adequate, relevant and not excessive in
relation to the purpose for which they are collected and/or further processed," and
Articles 7(c) and (e) provide that "Member States shall provide that personal data
may be processed only if... (b) processing is necessary for the performance of a
contract to which the data subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of
the data subject prior to entering into a contract ... or (e) processing is necessary
for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of
official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are
disclosed." See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, arts. 6(l)(c), 7(c), 7(e) 1995
O.J. (L 281) at 40.
99. See Rundfunk, 3 C.M.L.R. at 301-02 (ruling that, wherever the provisions
of a directive appear to be "unconditional and sufficiently precise," they may "be
relied on against any national provision which is incompatible with the directive or
in so far as they define rights that individuals can assert against the State").
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Directive could be relied on directly in a challenge to the Austrian
legislation. °°
The ECJ was thus reasonably successful in giving effect to the
tradeoffs set out in the Directive by saying that the public disclosure
of personal information is permissible under the Directive if it is
necessary for the acknowledged legislative purpose. °' The ECJ
instructed the Austrian courts to balance the interests between data
privacy and the free flow of data which is needed for an important
economic purpose, namely ensuring the efficient use of public
funds. 102 The ECJ's further instruction that the proper balance exists
only if the disclosure is necessary and appropriate to achieving the
stated legislative purpose would seem to dovetail perfectly with the
aims of the Directive: protection of the rights of individuals with
respect to their personal data and ensuring that the free flow of data
is not unnecessarily inhibited. 03 Further, the Court's equating of the
balancing of interests under the Directive with the balancing test
under the ECHR seems to get at the core of the tradeoffs the E.U.
legislators tried to establish in the Directive: the existence of an
interference with private life should be balanced against important
justifications of that interference.' 0 4 Rundfunk, however, was the easy
case. The interests at issue in Rundfunk make it reasonably easy to
balance; a person's income can be considered relatively private
information, but when there are compelling reasons for that
information to be publicized, privacy should give way to the
100. See id. at 302.
101. See id. at 299 (finding the legislative purpose to be the maintaining of
salaries "within reasonable limits" by guaranteeing "the thrifty and appropriate use
of public funds," and defining "necessary" as involving a "pressing social need"
where the measure employed:is "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued").
102. See id.
103. See id. at 300 (holding that the national courts can only conclude that the
interference that results from the application of the legislation is justified under
Article 8(2) of the ECHR if they find that disclosing the names of the employees is
"necessary for and appropriate to the aim of keeping salaries within reasonable
limits").
104. See Rundfunk, 3 C.M.L.R. at 300 (stating that, if national courts find, after
conducting the balancing test of the ECHR, that the legislation is incompatible
with Article 8 of the Convention, then they must find that the legislation is also
incompatible with Articles 6(l)(c), 7(c), and 7(e) of the Directive).
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compelling reasons. 05 The latter two cases present circumstances
that are not so straightforward.
B. BODIL LINDQVIST
Only several months after its decision in Rundfunk, on November
6, 2003, the ECJ handed down its second and more comprehensive
decision on the Directive in Bodil Lindqvist.10 6 The case involved a
website set up by Swedish volunteer catechist at a church in the
parish of Alseda in Sweden.0 7 The church lady, Ms. Bodil Lindqvist,
after having recently taken a computer course, had set up a website
using her home computer to assist parishioners in obtaining church-
related information.0 8 It is clear from the facts recited by the Court
and from accounts in the press that Ms. Lindqvist put up the website
with nothing but the good intention of helping her fellow
parishioners get needed information, primarily in preparation for
confirmation rituals. 10 9 She did it on her own time, using her own
equipment and was not paid for the task." 0
105. See id. at 301.
106. Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. 1-12971, 1 C.M.L.R. 20, 673
(2004); see also Jacqueline Klosek, European Court Establishes Broad
Interpretation of Data Privacy Law, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2004, at 22
(providing a brief background on the Directive, a summary of the major facts, and
the implications of the ECJ's decision); Dan Tench, You Can't Print That: Thanks
to European Privacy Rulings, the British Media May Find It Harder and Harder to
Prove Stories and Images Are in the Public Interest, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 5,
2004, at Media 1 (arguing that the decision represents the forefront of a broader
shift in European privacy protection soon to be applied to the British media);
Andre Fiebig, The First ECJ Interpretation of the Data Privacy Directive,
MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Dec. 2, 2006, available at 2003 WLNR 10746524
(summarizing the case and interpreting its holdings); Andre Fiebig, EIU
VIEWSWIRE SWEDEN, Sweden Regulations: ECJ Rules on Data Privacy Directive
Case, Jan. 14, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 13985779 [hereinafter Fiebig,
Sweden Regulations].
107. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 681.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 686 (noting that Mrs. Lindqvist set up the website "without any
intention of economic gain," only "as an ancillary activity to her volunteer work");
see also Tench, supra note 106 (stating that her efforts "seemed harmless" and that
she removed the controversial material immediately upon complaint).
110. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 692.
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On the site, the church lady included information about herself and
information relating to about 18 of her colleagues at the church."'
Although some of the church lady's colleagues were identified by
only first names, in some cases last names were also used." 2 She also
included other information about her colleagues such as their jobs
and hobbies and in some cases family circumstances and telephone
numbers were also posted." 3 In the case of one of her colleagues, the
church lady also posted information about that person having injured
her foot and that she was currently on half-time medical leave."14
According to the Court, all of this information was conveyed in a
"mildly humorous manner" and some news outlets reporting on the
case had referred to the website as "gossip.""' 5 Apparently, Lindqvist
did not discuss the postings with her colleagues or obtain their
consent prior to posting the information."16 Shortly after the site had
been put up, Lindqvist heard that some of her colleagues were
unhappy about it and she promptly removed it from the Internet."7
Although the website had been taken down almost immediately
after her church colleagues had complained, the Swedish data
protection authority brought charges against Mrs. Lindqvist under
Paragraph 49(l)(b) through (d) of the Personuppgiftslagen' 18,
Sweden's national legislation implementing the Directive." 9 In fact,
according to at least one media account, the church lady asked to be
prosecuted by the Swedish authorities because she viewed the whole
111. Id. at692.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.; Tench, supra note 106.
116. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 692 (adding that Mrs. Lindqvist did not notify the
state supervisory authority responsible for protecting electronically transmitted
data).
117. Id. at 692-93.
118. Id. at 693; see 1 § Personnupgiftslagen (SFS 1998:204) (providing that the
purpose of the Personuppgiftslagen (Personal Data Act of 1998) is to "protect
people against the violation of their personal integrity by processing of personal
data").
119. See Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 693 (stating that the public prosecutor charged
Mrs. Lindqvist with a breach of the Personnupgiftslagen based on three different
grounds).
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situation as "Big Brother gone mad" and she "wanted to be a test
case." 
120
Generally, the prosecution claimed that Linquist had (a)
"processed personal data by automatic means without giving prior
written notification" to the Data Protection Authority; (b) processed
sensitive personal data (the information regarding her colleague's
foot injury) without the consent of the data subject; and (c)
"transferred processed personal data to a third country without
authorisation."'' In the Swedish District Court, Linquist accepted the
facts but denied that she was guilty of any offense.1 22 The court,
however, found the church lady guilty and fined her SEK 4,000,
currently the equivalent of roughly $540, and ordered her to pay an
additional SEK 300 to a public fund for victims of crime.123
Lindquist appealed the conviction to the appellate court in
J6nkbping, Sweden124, and that court, being uncertain about the
interpretation of European Community law applicable in this area
(i.e., the Directive), stayed the appeal and referred seven questions
on the Directive to the ECJ for interpretation. 25 Some of the seven
questions were answered by the ECJ in its decision and some not.126
120. Peter Hitchens, The Superstar Footballer, a Swedish Lady's Injured Foot..
* and a Sinister Threat to Our Freedom, MAIL ON SUNDAY (U.K.), Jan. 11, 2004, at
54 (revealing that, according to her lawyer, Mrs. Lindqvist was "deeply upset,"
viewed the situation as "an infringement of her rights," did not expect to lose, and
felt "like the victim of a medieval witchhunt rather than a member of an advanced
European society").
121. See Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 693
122. See id.
123. See id. (explaining that the District Court established the amount of the fine
by multiplying a sum representing Mrs. Lindqvist's financial position (SEK 100),
by a factor representing the severity of the offense (40)).
124. See id. at 682.
125. Id. at 693-94. The seven questions referred by the Swedish court to the
ECJ were: (1) Whether the act of referring, on an intemet home page, to various
persons and identifying them by name or by other means, for example, by giving
their phone numbers, working conditions or hobbies, constitutes the "processing of
personal data wholly or partly by automatic means" within the meaning of Article
3(1) of the Directive; (2) If not, "can the act of setting up on an internet homepage
separate pages for about 15 people with links between the pages which make it
possible to search by first name" constitute the "processing otherwise than by
automatic means of personal data which form part of a filing system within the
meaning of Art. 3(1)" of the Directive; (3) If Mrs. Lindqvist's dealings were within
the scope the Directive, whether they are covered by one of the exceptions in
Article 3(2) of the Directive-i.e., activities that specifically fall outside the scope
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For the purposes of this discussion on tradeoffs, only the Court's
analyses on the third, fifth and sixth questions are relevant. 2 7
Questions one, two, four and seven, are relatively straightforward
applications of definitional terms in the Directive or related to the
harmonization of laws among Member States and are not directly
relevant to this discussion on tradeoffs. 128
On the third question, the Court held that none of the exceptions
under Article 3(2) of the Directive apply to exempt the church lady's
conduct. 129 As noted above, these exceptions basically fall into two
categories: (1) processing activities that fall outside the scope of
Community law (and Article 3(2) sets forth several categories of
activities that are outside the scope of Community law) and (2)
of Community law and processing operations concerning public security, defense,
State security, economic well-being of the State and activities of the State in areas
of criminal law, and/or data processing done by natural persons in the course of a
purely personal or household activity; (4) Whether an indication that a person has
injured her foot and is working half-time on medical grounds constitutes data
concerning health (one of several types of so-called "sensitive data") within the
meaning of Article 8(1) of the Directive; (5) whether data has been "transfer[red]
to a third country" within the meaning of Art 25 of the Directive by the act of
loading personal data onto an internet site hosted in the same state but accessible to
anyone who connects to the internet; (6) whether, as applied to these facts, the
restrictions contained in the Directive regarding the processing of personal data
conflict with the general principles of freedom of expression or other freedoms and
rights, which are applicable within the European Union.; and (7) whether Member
States may provide for greater protection of personal data or provide a broader
scope of application under the national implementing the Directive than that
called-for by the Directive itself. Id. at 693-94.
126. See id. at 695 (noting that the answer to question one eliminated the need to
answer question two).
127. Id. at 695-704.
128. On question one, the ECJ found that Lindqvist's conduct with the
information on her church colleagues did in fact constitute "processing of personal
information" since the information and the conduct fell squarely within the
definitions under Article 2 of the Directive. Id. at 695. No answer to question two
was required since question one had been answered in the affirmative. Id. On
question four, the ECJ had no trouble finding that Lindqvist's reference to her
colleague's injured foot constituted sensitive personal (medical) data under Article
8 of the Directive. Id. at 698. Finally, on question seven, the Court held that the
Directive does not merely provide for a minimal level of harmonization of the laws
of Member States (i.e., a floor), but rather, "harmonization which is generally
complete." Id. at 704. However, Member States are free to extend the scope of
their own implementing legislation to areas not within the scope of the Directive,
"provided that no other provision of Community law precludes it." Id. at 705.
129. Id. at 698.
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processing of personal data "by a natural person in the course of a
purely personal or household activity."' 30 Taking the second category
of exceptions first, the ECJ determined that Lindqvist's conduct did
not fit within that category since her making available personal data
regarding fellow church members and workers to the public on the
Internet was not a purely personal or household activity such as
keeping an address book or perhaps making a list of friends and
family for invitations to an event. 3' Lindqvist's activities concerned
a community-based organization and the information was designed
to reach some portion of the members of that community. 3 z For the
Court, it did not seem that there was much that was "purely
personal" or household-like about the church lady's activity.'33
On the first category of exceptions, the ECJ found that the church
lady's conduct did not fall outside the scope of Community law and
therefore was not excluded from the scope of the Directive. 3 4 The
church lady's argument that her conduct was in fact outside the
scope of Community law was, however, a pretty straight forward
one: since the European Union may legislate only strictly in
accordance with the powers conferred upon it by the Member States
through treaties'35 , and because the Directive was based on Article 95
EC 36 the purpose of which is the approximation of laws within the
Member States toward the establishment and functioning of the
internal market'37, then Lindqvist's wholly charitable and non-
economic conduct (which wouldn't seem to have much to do with
the internal market and which is an exercise of her freedom of
130. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 3(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at
281/39.
131. Lindqvist, I C.M.L.R. at 696. The Directive's preamble mentions
"correspondence" as an activity that is "exclusively personal or domestic." Council
Directive 95/46, supra note 4, pmbl. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 281/32.
132. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 692-93.
133. Id. at 698.
134. Id. at 696-98.
135. Recall that European legislation must be based on a foundational treaty
provision. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
137. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, pmbl. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at
281/32 (arguing that the Community must coordinate the laws of the Member
States to ensure that the flow of personal data is regulated in a consistent manner
for the internal market).
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expression) cannot fall within the scope of Community law.'38 In
fact, the Swedish government also seemed to agree (or at least not
disagree) with Lindqvist on this point when it submitted to the ECJ
that it cannot rule out the possibility that the exception under Article
3(2) of the Directive might apply to situations "in which a natural
person publishes personal data on an Internet page solely in the
exercise of his freedom of expression and without any connection
with a professional or commercial activity."'' 39 Interestingly, the
ECJ's Advocate General14 ° appointed to the case opined that, since
Lindqvist's activities were wholly non-economic and had no direct
connection with the functioning of the internal market, the data
processing was "outside the scope of Community law within the
meaning of Art. 3(2)..." and thus should not be subject to the
Directive. 141
The ECJ rejected Lindqvist's straightforward argument and held
that the exception did not apply; the church lady's conduct did not
qualify as an "activity which falls outside the scope of Community
law. ' 142 The Court explained (as it had done in Rundfunk) that just
because the Directive uses Article 95 EC as its foundational basis,
that, by itself, does not presuppose that every situation where the
Directive applies is actually linked with free movement 143 within the
Union and to the establishment of the internal market.1" The Court
further explained that to find otherwise would make the field of
application of the Directive uncertain and would thus be contrary to
one of the essential objectives of the Directive: to approximate the
laws of the Member States in order to eliminate obstacles to the
functioning of the internal market which arise from disparate
138. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 695-97.
139. Id.
140. The ECJ is composed of twenty-seven judges and eight advocate generals
who are responsible for assisting the court and presenting, "with complete
impartiality and independence," an opinion to the court in the cases assigned to
them. See The Court of Justice of the European Communities,
http://curia.europa.eu/en/instit/presentationfr/index-cje.htm (last visited Mar. 12,
2007).
141. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 686.
142. Id. at 697-98.
143. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
144. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 697-98.
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national legislative regimes. 45 The Court also examined the specific
activities mentioned in Article 3(2) that are considered outside the
scope of Community law, i.e., activities provided for by Titles V and
VI of the Treaty on the European Union,1 46 "processing operations
concerning public security, defense, State security and activities in
areas of criminal law.' 47 In saying that these examples are intended
to define the scope of the Article 3(2) exception, the Court stated
these are activities of the State and unrelated to the fields of activity
of individuals and thus, Lindqvist's non-commercial, charitable
activities could not be classified in the same category.'48 Therefore,
even though the church lady's conduct had no relation to commercial
or professional activity, was carried out for charitable purposes, was
an exercise of her right of free expression, and, in any event, would
not seem to have any effect on the functioning of the internal market,
the conduct was still within the scope of Community law and thus
subject to the Directive.'49
Probably, the most peculiar aspect of the ECJ's decision in
Lindqvist concerns its analysis of the fifth question: whether the
church lady's publication of the personal data on an Internet page
constitutes a transfer of personal data to third countries lacking
"adequate protection" as prohibited under Article 25 of the
Directive. 5 0
145. Id. at 697.
146. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 11-42,
reprinted in Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 1, 13-28 (E.U.)
[E.U. Treaty].
147. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 697-98.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 698-701; see also Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 25,
1995 O.J. (L 281) at 281/45. Immediately after its passage, Article 25 was the
subject of considerable controversy because the United States had been designated
by the European Commission as a country lacking "adequate protection" for
personal data. Such a designation created the potential for very difficult legal
consequences for the corporations collecting personal data on European citizens
and transferring the data into the United States. In 2000, the European Commission
agreed to exempt from enforcement of the Directive those U.S. companies that
complied with data protection standards negotiated by the U.S. Department of
Commerce and other agencies. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and
Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (July 24, 2000);
Commission Decision 2000/520, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 215) 7 (EC). The so-called
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Specifically, this question presupposes that the Internet page is
hosted by an Internet service provider ("ISP") located in an E.U.
Member State and that the information is accessible by anyone who
connects to the Internet including persons in non-E.U. Member
States.151
The Court determined that no transfer to a third country had taken
place under the described circumstances. 152 The Court reasoned that
it must account for both the practical and technical nature of Internet
operation and the purposes of Chapter IV of the Directive153 (the
chapter containing Article 25). 151 On the nature of the Internet, the
Court acknowledged that information on the Internet "... can be
consulted by an indefinite number of people living in many places at
almost any time."' 155 The Court further acknowledged that the
procedures for posting information on the Internet that were
available to people like Lindqvist at the time she had created her site
"Safe Harbor Agreement" actually consists principally of the communications
from the U.S. Department of Commerce to the European Commission of July 21,
2000 and from the European Commission back to the U.S. Department of
Commerce on July 28, 2000.
151. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 698. The Swedish appellate court had also asked if
the result would change if no one from a third country had, in fact, accessed the
information or the server where the Internet page was stored was physically
located in a third-country. Id. at 694. Since the Court had determined that no
transfer of data to a third country had taken place, it declined to provide any
answers to these other factual variations. Id. at 699-701. Several interested parties
filed submissions on this question. The Swedish Government and the E.U.
Commission considered that merely making such information accessible via the
Internet constitutes a transfer to third counties under Article 25 regardless of
whether the page is in fact accessed by anyone in a third country and regardless of
whether or not the server on which the information is stored is physically located
in a third country. Id. at 699. The Netherlands Government took the view that,
since "transfer" is undefined by the Directive, it must mean only intentional
transferring and that because no distinction can be made between means of third
party access, loading personal data on to an Internet page cannot constitute
transferring the data to a third country under Article 25. Id. Finally, the United
Kingdom submitted that Article 25 concerns transfer of data to third countries and
not accessibility to the data. "[T]ransfer," according to the UK, connotes "the
transmission of personal data from one place and person to another place and
person." Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 701.
153. Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 281/45-
46.
154. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 699.
155. Id.
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involved transmitting the data to the ISP who manages the computer
infrastructure needed to store the data and connect the server hosting
the site to the Internet. 5 6 This allows the data to be transmitted to
anyone who connects to the Internet and seeks access to it. 57 From
this brief explanation the Court concluded that under these
circumstances, where personal data appear on a computer in a third
country, coming from a person who has loaded them in the European
Union onto an Internet site, no direct transfer of data has occurred
between the two people but, instead, the transfer has taken place
through the infrastructure and the ISPs. 158 The Court then took pains
to stress that the conduct under scrutiny was not that of the ISPs, but
that of Lindqvist, the person who created the webpage and
transferred the data to an ISP for hosting.159
The Court went on to say that Chapter IV of the Directive
regarding transfers to third countries contains no reference to the
Internet 6° and, given how the Internet operates and the absence of
any criteria governing the Internet and third country transfers, in the
Directive, "one cannot presume that the Community legislature
intended the expression transfer [of data] to a third country to cover
the loading.., of data onto an Internet page, even if those data are
thereby made accessible to persons in third countries."' 6' Further, the
Court stated that if Article 25 were interpreted to mean that there is a
transfer of personal data to third countries every time personal data
were loaded onto an Internet page, the special regime created by
Article 25 to deal with third county transfers would become "a
regime of general application" dealing with the Internet. 62 Thus, if
even a single country were found to lack adequate protection and
where persons within that country had the technical means to access
the Internet, Member States would be "obliged to prevent any
personal data from being loaded onto the internet" so that it could not
156. Id.
157. Id. at 700.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 700-01.
162. Id. at 701. See generally Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 25,
1995 O.J. (L 281) at 281/45-46.
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be accessed.'63 Therefore, notwithstanding that the personal data of
E.U. citizens can. end up in a third country lacking adequate
protection, the ECJ declined to find that posting the data on the
Internet constitutes a transfer to a third country. 64
The sixth question put to the ECJ was whether the restrictions in
the Directive present a conflict with the general principles of
freedom of expression applicable in the European Union.1 65 The
Court said that the provisions in the Directive do not inherently bring
about restrictions that conflict with the general principles of freedom
of expression and it is for the national authorities to balance the
competing interests between data privacy and freedom of
expression. 66 The Court reasoned that, on its face, the Directive
recognizes that its provisions are meant to harmonize national laws
on data protection for both securing the free flow of data within the
European Union and protecting the rights of individuals in their
personal data and that there may likely be a tension between these
twin objectives. 67 In spite of recognizing the tradeoff that must be
made, the Court did not give priority to one of these fundamental
rights over the other in Lindqvist's case and left it for national
authorities to strike the balance. 68
C. THE PNR CASE
The most recent ECJ case to interpret the Directive is what has
come to be known as the PNR case. 169 PNR stands for "passenger
name record" and consists of information collected for the automated
reservation and departure control systems of commercial airlines and
which relates to individual passengers. 70 In the context of this ECJ
case, the PNR data specifically related to 34 data fields on
passengers including, among other items, names, addresses,
telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, payment and credit card
163. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R.at 701.
164., Id. at 700-01.
165. Id. at 701.
166. Id. at 703-04.
167. Id. at 702.
168. Id. at 703-04.
169. The PNR case actually consists of two cases that were heard together by the
ECJ but retained separate case numbers. See PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 256, 309.
170. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 319-20.
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information, travel itinerary, "no show" history, one way ticket
status, baggage and seat information, travel agency used, date of
flight reservation and ticket issuance and travel status of passenger.17 1
These data, in addition to other categories of data, are routinely
collected by air carriers in the course of supplying air travel services
to consumers. 72 The information can also be a valuable tool for
governments as they seek to combat terrorism and other international
crime by more closely monitoring who is entering and leaving the
country and by tracking particular individuals. 173 Because of the
usefulness of this data, the U.S. government began demanding the
turn-over of the PNR data collected by air carriers. 174 It was in this
context that the PNR case arose.
The PNR case consisted of two separate actions brought by the
Parliament against each of the Council and the Commission for
annulment of decisions reached by each of these E.U. bodies. 175 To
understand the decisions reached by the Commission and the
Council, some brief background is necessary.
Just after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United
States, the United States passed legislation requiring all air carriers
operating flights to or from the United States or through U.S.
territory to provide U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP")
with electronic access to all of the PNR data contained in their
171. See Commission Decision 2004/535, Attachment A, 2004 O.J. (L 235) at
22 (setting out the U.S. implementation of the Directive's Article 25 "adequate
level of protection" requirements with respect to third state transfers);
Undertakings of the Department of Homeland Security Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection Regarding the Handling of Passenger Name Record Data, 69
Fed. Reg. 41,543, 41,547 (July 9, 2004).
172. See, e.g., American Airlines, Privacy Policy,
http://www.aa.com/aa/i 18nForward.do?p=/footer/privacyPolicy.jsp, United
Airlines, Privacy Policy,
http://www.united.com/page/article/0,6722,1002,00.html?jumpLink=%2Fprivacy.
173. See Jeffrey W. Seifert, Congressional Research Service, DATA MINING AND
HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31798.pdf.
174. ld. at 8-9.
175. Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, Eur. Parliament v. Council of the Eur.
Union (PNR), 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721, 3 C.M.L.R. 9, 319-21 (2006). The Parliament's
case against the Council was designated C-317/04 and its case against the
Commission was designated C-318/04.
2007]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
reservation and departure control systems. 176 In June 2002, the
Commission, while recognizing the importance of the security
interests at stake, informed the U.S. government that the U.S.
legislation requiring access to PNR data could come into conflict
with European law on the protection of personal data. 177 Although
the U.S. authorities postponed the entry into force of the legislation
until March 2003, from that point forward the CBP refused to waive
the right to impose stiff penalties (or revoke landing privileges)
against air carriers not in compliance with the legislation.'78 The
European airlines were thus caught between a rock and a hard place:
they could either provide the PNR data to the CBP and, at the same
time, subject themselves to possible liability in the European Union
for violations of data protection laws, or they could comply with the
E.U. data protection laws and suffer penalties, risk having landing
privileges revoked and experience major disruptions to their
transatlantic service.179 In March 2003, several large airlines in the
European Union began providing the CBP with access to their PNR
data.' 180 Simultaneously, the Commission began negotiating with the
U.S. authorities towards an eventual agreement that would alleviate
the burden on the airlines by allowing the PNR data to be transferred
and still respect E.U. data protection laws.' 8' As a result of these
negotiations, an agreement between the European Union and the
United States on the sharing of the PNR data (the "Agreement") was
reached. 18 2 While the Council approved of the conclusion of the
Agreement, the Parliament was not pleased with the actions of either
the Commission or the Council.'83
176. See 49 U.S.C. § 44909(c)(3) (2006); 19 C.F.R. 122.49b(b) (Apr. 1, 2006).
177. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 319-20.
178. Id. Under 19 C.F.R. 122.14(d), CBP can revoke landing rights and under 49
U.S.C. § 46301 CBP can impose a fine of $25,000 for each day that the failure to
provide the PNR data continues. See 19 C.F.R. 122.49b(d) (Apr. 1, 2006); 49
U.S.C. § 46301(a) (2006).
179. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 319-20.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 320.
182. See U.S. Urges Global Commitment to Travel, Cargo, Standards and
Technology, ST. DEP'T PRESS RELEASES & DOCUMENTS, June 24, 2004, available
at 2004 WLNR 2606867; Sara Kehaulani Goo, E.U. Agrees to Give U.S. Airline
Passenger Data, TECHNEWS.COM, May 15, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
16682947.
183. See Tobias Buck, Legal Challenge Over Air Passenger Data, FIN. TIMES
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To summarize a complex and lengthy story, through the course of
the negotiations with the U.S. authorities and the resulting U.S.
agreement to undertakings regarding the handling of the PNR data,
the Commission' 84 eventually issued its decision on the adequacy of
protection that would be afforded to the PNR data by U.S.
authorities." 5
Various exchanges took place between the Commission and the
Parliament and the Council and the Parliament regarding the
Commission's decision on adequacy and the Council's proposal for
action in concluding the agreement with the United States.
8 6
Notwithstanding the Parliament's concern over the adequacy of
protection of the PNR data in the United States and that neither the
Commission nor the Council had the legal authority to act as they
proposed to act, on May 14, 2004, the Commission approved its final
Decision on Adequacy. 87 Then, on May 17, 2004, the Council
approved the conclusion of the international agreement with the
United States. 88 On July 27, 2004, the Parliament initiated
proceedings in the ECJ against both the Commission and the Council
to annul Commission's decision on adequacy and Council decision
to approve the conclusion of an agreement with the United States.18
9
The Parliament made several arguments in support of annulment
of each decision, some of which were based on privacy concerns. 90
(London), July 31, 2004, at World News 7; U.S./E.U./Air Transport: Parliament
Refers Data Transfer Issue to the Court of Justice, EUR. REP., June 26, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 7310733; Daniel Dombey & Ralph Minder, U.S.-E.U.
Deal on Flight Data Leads to Dispute, E1U VIEWSWIRE (E.U.), June 17, 2004, at
20.
184. SeePNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 320-21.
185. See supra note 68-70 and accompanying text. Under Article 25 of the
Directive, the Commission has the responsibility of determining the "adequacy" of
protection afforded personal data of E.U. citizens in non-E.U. countries. If the third
country in question "adequately" protects personal data (perhaps even if only
specific kinds of data), then a transfer of such data to the third country can take
place; if there is no such adequate protection, then transfer of the data is prohibited.
186. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 320-21.
187. Id. at 321.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. On the Commission's decision on adequacy, the Parliament claimed that
the Commission: (1) engaged in ultra vires action; (2) breached fundamental
principles of the Directive; (3) breached fundamental rights; and, (4) breached the
principle of proportionality. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 321. On the Council's decision,
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The Court, however, declined to entertain most of the Parliament's
arguments and, instead, annulled both decisions on very narrow
grounds. 191
First, on the Commission's decision, the Court zeroed-in on the
Parliament's argument that the Commission breached the
Directive.1 92 The Court determined that the Commission's actions
could not have been validly adopted on the basis of the Directive
since Article 3(2) of the Directive excludes from its scope the
processing of personal data in the course of activities which fall
outside Community law. 193 The processing of personal data in this
case, according to the Court, constituted processing operations
concerning public security and the activities of the State in the areas
of criminal law which are expressly excluded from the scope of the
Directive. 194 Thus, according to the Court, the Commission could not
act on the basis of the Directive using its Article 25 powers to assess
the adequacy of the level of protection afforded by the U.S.
authorities for the PNR data since the Directive itself excludes such
data processing activities from its scope. 195 Since the Court was able
to annul the Commission's adequacy decision on this basis, it made
no further determinations on the remaining arguments made by the
Parliament. 196
In its reasoning the Court drew a distinction between the data
processing done by the airlines in the course of selling airline tickets
and the data processing activities "regarded as necessary for
safeguarding public security .... "197 Further, the Court explained
the Parliament argued that the Council: (1) incorrectly used Article 95 of the
Treaty of the European Communities ("EC") as the legal basis for the decision; (2)
breached Article 300(3) of the EC; (3) breached Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights; (4) breached the principle of proportionality; (5)
breached the requirement to "state reasons" (ostensibly to support its decision);
and, (6) breached the principle of cooperation in good faith (ostensibly cooperation
with the Parliament). PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 323.
191. SeePNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 322-23
192. Id. at 321-23.
193. Id. As mentioned in Lindqvist, Article 3(2) specifically excludes processing
activities involving national security and criminal law. See supra notes 146-148
and accompanying text.
194. PAR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 322-23.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 323.
197. Id. at 322.
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that, although it held in Lindqvist that the processing activities
excepted from the scope of the Directive described in Article 3(2) are
activities of the State and unrelated to the field of activities of
individuals, this does not mean that the processing at issue in this
case is not covered by Article 3(2).198 "The transfer falls within a
framework established by the public authorities that relates to public
security."'199 So, even though in Lindqvist the ECJ carefully defined
the processing activities referred to in the Article 3(2) exceptions as
activities of the State (or of state authorities) and not related to the
field of activities individuals, in PNR, the Court essentially placed
the processing activities of private commercial actors (air carriers)
and their transfer of data to a non E.U. country in the same category
as State activity. z°
SConcerning the Council's decision approving the conclusion of the
Agreement, the ECJ used a similar basis for its annulment.20 1 This
portion of the decision is even more devoid of discussion on privacy
issues and therefore does not add much to the discussion here.
Suffice it to say that the ECJ determined that Article 95 EC was the
incorrect basis for the Council's decision to approve the conclusion
of the Agreement with the U.S. authorities.0 2 Basically, Article 95
EC represents one aspect of the first pillar powers of E.U.
institutions.2 3 Since, as was determined under the Court's analysis of
the Commission's decision, the processing activities were done for
purposes of law enforcement and public security (second and third
pillar matters), the Council should have relied on a third pillar basis
for its decision.20 4 In a rather terse statement the Court stated, "[t]he
Agreement relates to the same transfer of data as the decision on
198. Id. at 323; see also Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 697-98.
199. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 323.
200. Id. at 322-23.
201. Id. at 323-24.
202. Id.
203. Article 95(1) EC states "[t]he Council shall,.... adopt the measures for the
approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and
functioning of the internal market." See E.C. Treaty, supra note 48, art. 95(1),
2002 O.J. (C 325) at 69.
204. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 324 ("Article 95 EC, read in conjunction with Article
25 of the Directive, cannot justify Community competence to conclude the
Agreement.").
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adequacy and therefore to data processing operations which, as has
been stated above, are excluded from. the scope of the Directive.2 °5
Consequently, [the Council's] Decision... cannot have been validly
adopted on the basis of Article 95 EC. 2 °6
Cognizant of the drastic impact on air carriers and transatlantic
travel that its decision could have if it were to be immediately
effective, the ECJ left the Commission's decision on adequacy (and
also the Agreement) in effect until September 30, 2006.207 The ECJ
was apparently buying some time for the Commission and the
Council to renegotiate the Agreement with the United States using a
proper legal basis and also meeting the Parliament's approval.20 8 In
October 2006, the European Union and the United States in fact
reached a second, but temporary, agreement on the sharing of PNR
data.209 In most substantive respects the agreement is the same as the
one annulled by the ECJ and it will remain in place until July
2007.21 ° This time, the European Union used an ostensibly proper
basis for the agreement 21 ' and the European Union and the United
States are in the process of negotiating a permanent agreement for
the sharing of PNR data. However, this second temporary agreement
does not seem to do much beyond preserving the status quo, and that,
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See Nicola Clark & Matthew L. Wald, Hurdle for U.S. In Getting Data on
Passengers, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2006 at Al (quoting a U.S. diplomat's
contention that "Washington would seek a diplomatic arrangement with the E.U.
that respected the ruling without disrupting air travel").
209. See Sarah Laitner, Brussels Agrees Pact Handing Details on Airline
Passengers to U.S. Agencies, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 7, 2006, at Europe 7;
Europeans Agree on Sharing Airline Passenger Data, ST. DEP'T PRESS RELEASES
AND DOCUMENTS, Oct. 6, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 17427225.
210. The agreement is basically the same substantively because it binds the
United States to the Undertakings-regarding handling of the personal data-that
were part of the Agreement that the ECJ nullified. See Agreement Between the
European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer
of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States
Department of Homeland Security, 2006 O.J. (L 298) 29, 29-30.
211. The Council Decision to approve the new temporary agreement with the
United States specifically references Title V (foreign and security policy-second
pillar) of the Treaty on the European Union as the foundational basis for the
decision. See Council Decision 2006/729, pmbl., 2006 O.J. (L 298) 27, 27 (E.U.);
E.C. Treaty, supra note 48, arts. 24, 38, O.J. (C 325) at 18, 26.
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for only a short while. Since the conclusion of the new agreement,
several ministers of the E.U. Parliament have continued to voice their
dissatisfaction over the way the personal data of European air
travelers will be handled by the United States and they insist that any
future permanent agreement must meet European privacy
standards.212 Therefore, it seems unlikely that this new temporary
agreement or any subsequent permanent one will be able to escape a
legal challenge on privacy grounds. And, this time, the ECJ will not
be able to use narrow technical means to avoid the larger questions
of privacy.
IV. UNREALIZED TRADEOFFS
A. DATA PRIVACY VERSUS FREE FLOW OF DATA IN COMMERCE
The ECJ's holding in Rundfunk seems to do a pretty good job at
realizing the data privacy versus the free flow of data tradeoffs as set
out in the Directive. The ECJ examined the Austrian statute requiring
public disclosure of the personal financial data of public employees
to determine if the disclosure was warranted in light of an important
public purpose." 3 This seems to be a reasonable and practical
application of the Directive's general principles. Indeed, Articles 7
and 13 of the Directive provide exceptions for Member States to
allow the processing of personal data when the processing is
necessary for public interest purposes including economic interests,
212. See E.U. Concern at Data Transfers, BBC NEWS, Jan. 31, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6315893.stm (discussing the continued concerns
of European officials, including one who noted that "[t]he right to privacy for me
is non-negotiable"); see also Laitner, supra note 209 (quoting one Parliamentarian
saying, "[i]t seems that the European Union has totally caved in to U.S.
blackmail," and another calling the new temporary PNR agreement the "least worst
option," saying that "[i]t seems clear ... that the current American administration
is determined to extract ever more personal data and share with the wider
intelligence community."); Molly Moore, Deal Reached on Fliers' Data: E. U. Will
Share Info With U.S. - Some European Officials Skeptical, SEATTLE TIMES,
October 7, 2006, A4 (quoting a German Minister of the European Parliament who
noted that "[t]he E.U. has once again caved in to the U.S. pressure at the expense
of E.U. citizens' civil liberties").
213. See Joined Cases C-465/00, C-138 & 139/01, Rechnungshof v. Rundfunk,
2003 E.C.R. 1-4989, 3 C.M.L.R. 10 (2003); supra Part III.A (discussing
Rundfunk).
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and as such, these provisions clearly express the tradeoff between
data privacy and the free flow of data: in commerce.1 4 Further, the
ECJ's equating of the balancing of the interests that must take place
under the Directive to the balancing done pursuant to Article 8 of the
ECHR (interference with private life versus a justification of the
interference), also embodies the tradeoffs. 215 The ECJ's guidance to
the Austrian court to conduct this balancing test looks to be what the
framers of the Directive had in mind: the fundamental right of
privacy should be weighed against important public interests that
justify interference with that fundamental right. 1 6
Perhaps the only thing amiss in Rundfunk as far as the tradeoffs
are concerned is the fact that the ECJ said that it is for the national
courts to decide whether the interference with the data privacy of the
effected Austrian citizens was justified by the important public
economic purpose. 217 By giving the question back to the Austrian
national courts to decide, it is possible that the precise tradeoffs in
the Directive will be given effect to differing degrees in different
E.U. Member States. Therefore, it is possible that the same tradeoff
will not be made throughout the European Union. This problem,
however, is more about E.U. institutional structure and less about the
particular privacy versus data flow tradeoffs even though the
problem affects how the tradeoffs are realized. Be that as it may,
Rundfunk shows a pretty straightforward, if not inoffensive,
application of the Directive and the tradeoffs between data privacy
and data flow in commerce were largely realized. 8 To the extent
that Rundfunk left the impression that the Directive's tradeoffs could
be realized, that impression can no longer be maintained after
Lindqvist and PNR.2 19
214. Council Directive, supra note 4, arts. 7(e),13(l) 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 40,
42.
215. Rundfunk, 3 C.M.L.R. at 298-300; See discussion, supra notes 102-104
and accompanying text (discussing the court's balancing approach).
216. Rundfunk, 3 C.M.L.R. at 298-300.
217. Seeid. at300.
218. Id. at 298-300 (holding that the collection of information on public and
human resource expenditures unquestionably serves a vital public interest).
219. Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. 1-12971, 1 C.M.L.R. 20 (2004);
Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, Eur. Parliament v. Council of the Eur. Union
(PNR), 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721, 3 C.M.L.R. 9 (2006); see supra Part III.A-B.
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Lindqvist demonstrates in several ways that the Directive's
spelled-out tradeoffs in data privacy and free flow of data cannot be
effectuated in the real world. First, Lindqvist exposes this
ineffectiveness in the Court's determination of the Directive's scope.
On the surface, there does not seem to be anything that is per se
unreasonable about the Court's holding that the conduct at issue was
within the scope of Community law (and thus that the Directive
applied).22 ° Not requiring a showing of an actual link between every
situation covered by the Directive and "free movement" within the
Union (i.e. a link with the functioning of the internal market) would
seem to make sense because there are undoubtedly situations that,
while not directly involving commercial or market-oriented conduct,
might affect the functioning of the internal market.2 ' The Lindqvist
Court, however, did not discuss any such indirect effect on the
functioning of the internal market that the church lady's conduct
might have had and merely reasoned that to require such a link
would result in uncertainty in the field of application of the
Directive.222 The Court essentially said that even though Lindqvist's
conduct was non-commercial and not for profit (suggesting, at best, a
tenuous tie to the functioning of the internal market), that did not
matter.223 It was enough for the Court that no actual link between the
free movement and the situation covered by the Directive need be
shown and that her conduct did not neatly fit into the first category of
exceptions, State activities, or the second category, "purely personal"
or "household" activities. 24
At first blush, it would appear that the ECJ is applying a similar
reasoning to that found in the Commerce Clause 225 line of United
States Supreme Court cases. Under those U.S. cases, Congress'
Commerce Clause power is able to reach conduct that is non-
economic or wholly intrastate so long as the conduct has a
220. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 697-98.
221. See id. at 697 (holding that a link requirement would make the laws more
uncertain and create more disparate national legislation).
222. Id. at 697-98.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 698 (holding that the exceptions apply "only to the activities which
are expressly listed there or which can be classified in the same category").
225. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (giving the U.S. Congress "the power ... to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes").
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"substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." 226 If the ECJ
were just giving a broad construction to the parameters of
Community law so that E.U. laws passed on the basis of facilitating
the functioning of the internal market can govern conduct that is non-
commercial but that still might affect the Community, it would seem
to be a reasonable attempt at effectuating the tradeoffs. The Directive
(and thus the tradeoffs) would be triggered if an effect on the
functioning of the internal market could be shown. But this is not
what the ECJ was doing. The U.S. Commerce Clause line of cases
articulated the substantial effect standard and then applied that
standard to the facts of a given case. 27 The Court in Lindqvist does
not supply a rule to determine when conduct would be too far
removed from the functioning of the internal market to be considered
outside the scope of Community law.228 Therefore, the ECJ seems to
be giving the Directive a construction that is limited only by two
narrow categories of exceptions.22 9 Such a broad construction leaves
individuals like Lindqvist who engage in non-commercial activity
that is in essence speech, exposed to liability under the Directive.
The framers of the Directive certainly could not have been interested
in regulating conduct like the church lady's. And, if they were
interested in regulating this type of activity, the tradeoff as it is
shown by Lindqvist is not one that is desirable. A rule that makes the
tradeoff as it did in Lindqvist restricts the individual's right to
communicate about others even when such communication has
nothing to do with commercial activity and is essentially an exercise
of free expression.
226. Beginning with Wickard v. Filburn, the United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that entirely intrastate and often non-commercial conduct can be
reached by Congress under its Commerce Clause power if the conduct in question
"exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." See Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that Congress could proscribe a
farmer's production of wheat for personal consumption because the activity
substantially affected interstate commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
559 (1995) ("Congress' commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce." (citations omitted)); Gonzalez v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15-18 (2005) ("Congress has the power to regulate activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.").
227. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 15-26 (collecting cases).
228. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 697-98.
229. Id.
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While it is true that the church lady's conduct was, strictly
speaking, neither state conduct nor purely personal, it is conduct that
would not seem to be what the Directive is aimed at controlling. 230
Whether it is the poorly conceived wording of the Article 3(2)
exceptions or the inflexibility of the ECJ in interpreting it, the result
is the same: non-commercial, non-profit conduct like Lindqvist's,
that is not different in any important respect from a person using or
relaying information about friends and perhaps passing on a phone
number to someone else or posting the information on a bulletin
board in the lobby of a church, gets pulled into the same category as
a huge data aggregator that collects consumer information for
consumer profiling and marketing purposes. 231  The practical
consequences of this are enormous. It means that just about any
processing of personal data, unless it can safely be categorized as
done in the course of a purely personal or household activity or
categorized as an activity of the State, is subject to the provisions of
the Directive. In fact, not long after the ECJ rendered its decision in
Lindqvist, the Norwegian data protection authorities announced that
they would be seeking to prosecute web site operators that post
photos of people without their consent.232 The Directive is thus
neither effectively making the tradeoffs that it purports on its face
nor are these tradeoffs made where they should be made since the
church lady's conduct is not likely to be the kind of conduct that
raises concerns about data privacy.
In a second and quite different way, Lindqvist demonstrates that
the data privacy tradeoffs in the Directive cannot be realized. The
230. While the Directive's preamble contains a number of points indicating
tradeoffs between data privacy and data flow, it makes special mention of
economic activities such as the increase in "the exchange of personal data between
undertakings," the fact that differing levels of privacy protection in Member States
can be "an obstacle to the pursuit of a number of economic activities at the
Community level and distort competition," and the idea that equivalent data
protection is "vital to the internal market." Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4,
pmbl. 5,7-8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 31-32. This strongly suggests that even
though Lindqvist's activities were caught in the wide web of the Directive, this
may be due more to the failure of the framers to exclude processing activities of
this type, i.e., miscalculating the tradeoffs, or because the ECJ was too inflexible
when interpreting Article 3(2).
231. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 3(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at
39.
232. See Klosek, supra note 106.
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Court's holding that posting personal data on the Internet where the
ISP is located within the European Union and where the data is
accessible by persons located in third countries does not constitute
the transfer of data to a third country233 is another application of the
Directive that leads to results opposite the aims of the Directive. Yet,
the ECJ did not seem to have much choice to interpret it differently.
The ECJ relied on a distinction between the accessibility of data by
persons in a third country and the actual transfer of the data by the
data controller to those persons.234 This reasoning seems contrived
when it is obvious that the person posting the personal data on the
Internet means for it to be available to other persons who use the
Internet.
The Court also relied on the apparent situation that, if Article 25's
prohibition on transfer of data to third countries lacking adequate
protection were intended to include posting such data on the Internet,
Article 25 would necessarily become a regime generally applicable
to Internet transfers instead of being specifically concerned with
transfers of data to third countries.235 While the Court's statement
about a regime applicable to processing on the Internet may be true,
it is also a recognition that the theoretical underpinnings of the
Directive do not match up to the practical realities of sharing and
transferring of information over the Internet. It should make little
difference whether the data controller actually placed the personal
data in the hands of a person in a third country or transferred the data
by other means such as the Internet. For purposes of the data privacy
tradeoffs in the Directive, once personal data is posted on the
Internet, it is in that third country and accessible. If the third country
in question lacks adequate protection for the data, the personal data
of E.U. citizens is no longer protected once in that country,
regardless of how it got there. Under the Court's stilted interpretation
of Article 25's application to the Internet, entirely different results
would obtain if the church lady had sent the personal data by postal
233. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 701.
234. Id. at 700-01 (stressing that it is not considering the processing activities of
the hosting providers who may, in fact, be physically transferring data to someone
accessing the Internet).
235. Id. at 701.
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service, to say, data brokers Choicepoint or Acxiom in the United
States instead of using the Internet.236
The Court's holding on the Article 25 transfer question therefore
recognizes the dilemma that to hold that posting the information on
the Internet constitutes a transfer would generally either require
eliminating the use of the Internet or make the enforcement of the
Directive's data protection regime virtually impossible since it would
require vigorous policing of the Internet. The Court's holding creates
a loophole by which the privacy rights of E.U. citizens under the
Directive are not protected when it was clearly the intent to protect
these rights in the circumstance where data might be transferred to a
third country. The ECJ was caught in the difficult position of trying
to maintain the Directive's effect while not allowing this flaw to
swallow the entire regime. Essentially, the inability to reconcile the
Article 25 transfer prohibition with the practical and ubiquitous
nature of the Internet shows that the Directive's purported tradeoffs
can not in fact be made when it comes to use of the Internet.
As a practical matter, the fact that posting information on the
Internet does not constitute a transfer of data to a third country has,
however, been largely well-received by the business community.237
While this aspect of the case does not mean that by posting personal
data on the Internet, businesses are able to avoid their obligations
under the Directive, it does mean that when an E.U. business
provides personal data to its partners or affiliates in third countries
(the United States, perhaps) via posting it on the Internet, they do not
commit a separate violation of the Directive by transferring the
information in this manner.
The down-side of this is the negative consequence for the E.U.
citizen whose data ends up in the United States and would no longer
seem to be subject to the stringent controls in Europe. Thus, while an
E.U. citizen may have provided the necessary unambiguous consent
to the controller in Europe and can basically revoke that consent and
has rights of action against the controller for violations of data
236. See id. at 699-700 ("Where a third country does not ensure an adequate
level of protection the transfer of personal data to that country must be prohibited."
(emphasis added)).
237. See Fiebig, Sweden Regulations, supra note 106 ("In general this [decision]
is good news for business.").
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protection laws, these protections evaporate once the data finds its
way into a third country lacking adequate protection and the data is
processed by an affiliate in the third country.
The Lindqvist case also highlights a third way in which the
Directive's tradeoffs are not being realized. In its holding that the
Directive does not conflict with general principles of freedom of
expression, the ECJ essentially recognized this tension and said that
it is for the national courts to balance the fundamental interests of
data privacy and freedom of expression.238 While this may sound like
the Court is giving effect to the tradeoffs by way of a balancing test,
the fact that the Court did not supply such a test but merely kicked
the question back to the national courts to decide shows that the
tradeoff is not actually given any effect. Individual Member States
will have to give effect to the tradeoff between data privacy and
freedom of expression and do so without explicit guidance from the
Directive or ECJ as to where the data privacy line begins and the
freedom of expression line ends. The tradeoffs here are thus not
made by the Directive but ad hoc by the Member States which may
lead to disparate balancing among the Member States.
B. DATA PRIVACY VERSUS SECURITY
The Directive's attempt to balance the need to process personal
data for public security purposes against data privacy is also
unworkable.23 9 Although the Directive's exclusion of important state
activities from its scope and its exceptions to state obligations when
security is concerned demonstrates that the Directive is intended in
part to balance public security against data privacy, the PNR case
shows that this balancing is not practically possible. 4 °
First, the ECJ's holding in PNR on the applicability and scope of
the Directive shows that this particular tradeoff cannot be realized. 41
The ECJ essentially invalidated the Commission's decision on the
238. Lindqvist, 1 C.M.L.R. at 703-04.
239. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, art. 3(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 39
(exempting public security operations from the scope of the Directive).
240. Id. pmbl. 13, 16, 30, 43, arts. 3(2), 7(e), 8(4), 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at
32, 34, 39.
241. Joined Cases C-317 & 318/04, Eur. Parliament v. Council of the Eur.
Union (PNR), 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721, 3 C.M.L.R. 9, 324 (2006).
790 [22:745
PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY TRADEOFFS
adequacy of protection of personal data in the United States because
the transfer of PNR data by commercial airlines to U.S. authorities
was accomplished pursuant to a security/criminal law framework
established by public authorities. 42 Thus, the Article 3(2)'s exception
for certain state activities was triggered and rendered the Directive
inapplicable to the processing activities.243 At first glance, it appears
that exactly what was supposed to happen did happen: E.U. Member
States are concerned about preserving their sovereignty in the area of
state security and required that the Directive not apply to security
related activities. The exception was thus triggered which brought
the data processing activity outside the scope of Community law and
of the Directive. On the other hand, a comprehensive data protection
regime should not become inoperable when the question concerns
data privacy versus data flow for security, and especially not when
the comprehensive regime on its face purports to deal with the
privacy versus security issue as the Directive does.
Further, the unrealized tradeoff between data privacy and security
is evident in that the state security at issue could not have been the
type of state security intended to trigger the exception. The state
security exception under Article 3(2) should not have been triggered
since the personal data at issue had been collected by commercial
airlines in the European Union and transferred by them to the U.S.
authorities. Although the Court took pains to distinguish the
processing activities of the commercial airlines2 44 from the
processing that took place pursuant to the security/criminal law
framework put into place by public authorities, the security/criminal
law framework was not that of the European Union but, rather of the
United States.2 45 The demand by the United States for the PNR data
from the air carriers was the genesis of all subsequent action on this
issue by E.U. authorities. The Commission had even made the U.S.
authorities aware of the potential conflict between the compliance
with U.S. law and the compliance with E.U. data protection
242. Id. at 323.
243. Id.
244. That is, the processing of personal data required in the course of the sale
and purchase of airline tickets.
245. See PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 322. (distinguishing "data processing necessary for
a supply of services" from "data processing regarded as necessary for safeguarding
public security and for law-enforcement purposes").
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standards.246  In fact, the ECJ even acknowledged that the
requirements for the transfer of the PNR data are based on the U.S.
statute and implementing regulations promulgated under it.247 It was
therefore not a European security/criminal law framework under
which the decisions of the Commission and Council were made and
thus they should not have been excluded from the Directive's scope.
The Commission's motivation in negotiating any agreement with
the United States for the sharing of PNR data seems to have been
primarily to preserve the privacy protections of E.U. citizens and
avoid negative economic consequences to the commercial interests
of E.U. air carriers and the traveling public. The aims of the
Commission and the Council in proceeding as they did on the PNR
issue appear to be more related to commerce than to security and
criminal law. While the European Union recognized the U.S. need
for the data, the European Union sought to make sure that any turn
over of the data would also include protections of it. 48 Therefore, the
Commission's decision on adequacy, which would have (1) provided
additional protections to the data of E.U. citizens in the United States
by getting the United States to agree to privacy protections it would
not have otherwise provided, (2) avoided the negative economic
consequences to E.U. air carriers and to the public and (3) provided
enhanced security in connection with U.S. bound flights, was not
allowed to take effect because the ECJ deemed the Directive
inapplicable to the Commission's actions.2 49 Thus, language of the
Directive itself excluded this situation from its scope and no effective
tradeoff between privacy and security resulted.
On a related point, PNR shows that the security tradeoff is not
realized because the Commission was not allowed to do what it is
supposed to do under Article 25 of the Directive: assess the adequacy
of protection in third countries and negotiate with the third country to
246. Id. at 319-20 (following the explicit U.S.-E.U. dialogue on the
implementation of the Directive).
247. Id. at 319-22 ("It is apparent from the sixth recital in the preamble to the
[Commission's] decision [on adequacy] that the requirements for that transfer are
based on a statute enacted by the United States . . . and on implementing
regulations adopted by CBP under that statute.").
248. Id. at 319-20 (following negotiations concerning the adequacy of U.S.
protections).
249. Id. at 323.
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obtain an adequate level of data protection. 2 ° The Directive purports
to address the security concern by relaxing the data protection
obligations for states in matters of security and by excluding certain
state activities from its scope. 5 It simultaneously purports to provide
for increased protection of personal data in the transnational context
by creating a scheme by which the Commission could assess the
level of protection in a third country and negotiate with that country
for increased protection if necessary.252 The Commission did exactly
what the Directive tells it to do, yet the ECJ nullified its actions.
Therefore, there is no resultant increase in data protection for E.U.
citizens and no enhanced security for the transatlantic flying public.
PNR shows that the privacy versus security tradeoff is not realized
in another important way.253 By nullifying the decisions of the
Commission and the Council, the ECJ has essentially sacrificed the
security of both the United States and the European Union. It is
difficult to imagine that the PNR data would not be useful in
combating terrorism and other international criminal enterprises,
evils that both the European Union and the United States have a
vested and professed interest in combating. 254 The PNR data provides
a means by which to track suspects and identify potential
perpetrators. The ECJ's decision rendering the U.S./E.U. agreement
to share the PNR data ineffective, has essentially propelled the
interest in data privacy to a far higher priority than interests in
security. The language of the Directive shows the intent to balance
these interests and the Commission and Council sought to give life to
that balance by negotiating an agreement that would simultaneously
protect privacy under E.U.-like privacy standards and allow security
concerns to be addressed. But, the ECJ's decision invalidated the
Commission and Council's attempt at effectuating the security
tradeoff. Now, if the data is made unavailable to the United States,
the United States will lack an important tool in combating crime and
250. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 324.
251. See Council Directive 95/46, supra note 4, arts. 3(2), 13, 1995 O.J. (L 281)
at 39, 42.
252. See id. art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 45.
253. PNR, 3 C.M.L.R. at 324-25.
254. See id. at 319-20 (noting the Commission's "acknowledg[ment] of the
security interests at stake" and the Council's assertion that "[t]he fight against
terrorism... justifies the proposed measures").
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terrorism which may lead to a less secure environment for both the
United States and the European Union. While data privacy in the
European Union has been preserved, it has been at the expense of
security in the United States and in the European Union. And, it has
not merely been a tipping of the scales slightly in one direction. As
far as the PNR data is concerned, privacy has been completely
maintained and security completely sacrificed.
The consequences that may follow from the ECJ's ruling in PNR
show just how poorly the data privacy versus security tradeoff is
made by the Directive. The lack of clarity that now attends to
situations where private commercial actors collect data but where
that data is then used for a law enforcement or quasi-law
enforcement purpose presents particular difficulties. PNR creates a
lack of protection of the European citizen since it is no longer clear
that data collected for commercial purposes but which is later used
by police are protected by the Directive. So, the Directive, with its
seemingly clear spelling-out of obligations and exceptions for both
public and private actors, now perhaps will not protect the privacy
interests it was designed to protect once the data has moved beyond
the initial controller who may have obtained the data subject's
unambiguous consent.
By way of extension, there is also uncertainty regarding private
data transfers that somehow relate to law enforcement or public
security. Examples might be transfers undertaken by private sector
actors at the request or direction of public authorities engaged in law
enforcement or security activities or purely private sector transfers
undertaken to combat fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting or
identity theft. When Visa or MasterCard collect data in connection
with anti-fraud activities, are these data now done within the
framework of law enforcement established by public authorities so
that the Directive no longer applies? The dual facets of fraud
prevention, both within the realm of the criminal law and in the
interests of private businesses like credit card companies, make it
difficult to determine if, after PNR, such data processing would be
subject to the Directive. If the Directive does not apply to such
situations because the activity is deemed a law enforcement/security
related activity, then such private processors might be able to act
with impunity against the interests of data subjects which does not
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amount to a desirable privacy/data flow tradeoff when private
commercial actors are involved.
It is also worth noting that even though the status quo of the PNR
issue has been maintained by a subsequent new temporary agreement
(with a proper legal basis), the issue of the privacy versus security
tradeoff has not gone away and will likely surface as soon as a more
permanent arrangement comes into being.
C. LESSONS FROM EUROPE
The picture that emerges from the ECJ cases on the Directive is
that the European Union approached the personal data protection
issue with two main assumptions in place: any legislation should be
comprehensive and broadly cover all sorts of processing activities,
and privacy in personal data is paramount to other concerns. The
above analysis on the ECJ cases demonstrates that both of these
assumptions do not necessarily provide a sound basis on which to
develop a regime that will both protect personal data and, at the same
time, not hinder its flow. It seems that the European Union did not
give enough consideration to what particular problems people worry
about when it comes to their personal data, nor did it fully consider
the balancing of interests.
The European Union perhaps went too far in making its regime
comprehensive. The lack of focus on particular data protection issues
that citizens are really concerned about led to legislation that
regulates not only conduct that citizens worry about but also
innocuous conduct like the church lady's. For example, most citizens
do not want large shadowy enterprises collecting data on them to
create digital dossiers255 that are used by private and public sector
actors without the data subject's knowledge. However, most citizens
would not want to be restricted from expressing themselves just
because the expression involves information about others. The E.U.
legislators would have been wise to approach the data protection
issue with more focus on exactly what people care about when it
comes to others processing their personal data, but instead, they took
255. The term "digital dossier" is used by Daniel Solove to describe
comprehensive digital profiles created primarily by data aggregators like
ChoicePoint and Acxiom. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 13-26
(Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2004).
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a panoramic approach and wound-up restricting conduct that is in
fact desirable in a democratic society.
Although much of the Directive's language seems pointed toward
the dual goals of privacy and harmonizing the data protection laws
within the European Union so as not to disrupt data flow, the cases
make clear that the Directive was crafted with privacy as the
overriding concern. Of course, this is only natural; if there were no
regulation of data privacy, the undesirable uses of personal data
would surely flourish and regulation would be needed to remedy the
problem. Regulation aimed at remedying a privacy problem would
naturally have 'creating more privacy' as its main objective.
However, approaching the problem from this angle (that more
privacy is the principle concern) ignores the importance of the
competing goal of ensuring societal benefits that accrue from free
flow of data. In other words, a comprehensive regime should start
from the premise that what we want is to achieve the right balance
and not from the premise that privacy is lacking so we need more of
it. The flow of data in a democratic and free-market society is
essential to its functioning. Europe's law seems to have been enacted
from a "privacy is paramount" perspective with less emphasis on
balancing privacy against accessibility of data.
Given these shortcomings of the Directive and mistaken premises
on which it was based, U.S. law makers should carefully consider
making any comprehensive U.S. data protection legislation apply
only to commercial actors. Commercial actors could be held to
higher standards in the handling of citizens' personal data while
leaving individual citizens not engaged in commercial or
professional activities free to use and disclose personal data on
others. The higher standards for commercial actors could be similar
to the broad standards that apply to everyone under the E.U.
Directive and incorporate the eight general data protection principles
enshrined in the Directive.256 Any time that there is a commercial
component to an individual citizen's .personal data processing, they
would then be subject to the higher standard just as any other
commercial actor is. This would also create an incentive for citizens
to share needed information with commercial enterprises, for
256. See supra note 56.
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example, their employers, their banks and healthcare providers,
knowing that the information would be protected. It would also
encourage citizens to avoid sharing information with private
individuals who, in the data subject's opinion, should not have
possession of it. Finally, it would not hamper citizens' private and
non-commercial ability to freely express themselves even where it
involves information about others.
A second consideration that should be taken into account by U.S.
law makers is the realities of international data transfers. Any
comprehensive U.S. legislation would need to deal with the question
on protections afforded to personal data once it leaves the borders of
the United States. The global economy being what it is today means
that cross-border data transfer must be facilitated.25 That the Internet
is one of the most important means of cross-border communication is
obvious. Therefore, any data protection scheme should take account
of the crucial role that the Internet plays in data flow and recognize
that once personal data is placed on the Internet it is available and
useable, for good or for worse, in places that have different
protection (or none) than the place from which the data originated.
Perhaps the answer is, instead of aiming enforcement at the
transferor as the Directive does, to use an extraterritorial application
of a U.S. data protection regime to tag offenders in foreign counties
with liability under the U.S. law. For example, when a data
aggregator sets up shop in India and is collecting data on American
consumers that it gathers via the Internet and then violates a
provision of the U.S. law, it could be hauled into a U.S. court if it has
sufficient contacts with the United States which it would likely have
if data on American consumers is important enough to its business to
aggregate. Such a scheme would generally make U.S. data protection
standards apply to data on U.S. citizens wherever it winds up.
A third point that should be considered by U.S. law makers is that
there are certain societal needs that may outweigh the need for
257. In fact, differences in the level of protection provided for personal data in
the United States and in the European Union almost led to a trade embargo which
was avoided by the Safe Harbor Agreement. See Council Directive 95/46, supra
note 4, pmbl. 56, 59, art. 25, 1995 O.J. (L 281) at 36-37, 45; Issuance of Safe
Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg. at
45,667; Commission Decision 2000/520, supra note 150, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 215)
at 2.
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privacy in personal information. Although commercial actor's
collection of personal data for commercial purposes may not
outweigh an individual's right to keep personal information safe,
when the need for the data is related to public security, for example,
most Americans might say that this should take precedence over
privacy. The government should of course be subject to high
standards of care for the personal information it obtains and perhaps
be prohibited from handing it over to third parties (commercial actors
or other governments). But, in an age where security is a real concern
and much of what threatens security is done through information,
law enforcement in the United States should not be hampered to the
degree that they are under the E.U. Directive. Any approach to the
drafting of comprehensive data protection legislation should
therefore proceed on the basis of balancing the privacy interests
against the security interests rather than beginning from the premise
that privacy is the norm and data flow is the exception.
V. CONCLUSION
In debating the form that any proposed data protection regime
might take in the United States, much can be learned from Europe's
mistakes in this area. As laudable as the goals behind the European
Data Privacy Directive may be, the ECJ cases show that in several
important respects these goals are not practically capable of
realization. The lines demarcating the tradeoffs between privacy and
data flow as drawn by Europe show that privacy prevails over data
flow in a non commercial expressive context. Data privacy is also
given paramount importance to the practical exclusion of security
interests that depend on the flow of data. The ECJ cases have also
shown that the rights extended to E.U. citizens by the Directive fail
to recognize the practical realities of how data is used in global
commerce. Although the Directive portends to have these protections
apply to the personal data wherever it may wind up, the nature of
data transfer methods like the Internet defy the scheme by which the
Directive attempts to secure this protection outside the European
Union. If comprehensive data protection legislation is a future
possibility in the United States, law makers would be well-advised to
focus more specifically on the particular data privacy problems
caused by personal data being too freely available and avoid
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approaching the issue with the assumption that data privacy in
general is inherently better than its ability to flow freely.
